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GOD, GALILEO, AND GOVERNMENT:
TOWARD CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION
FOR SCIENTIFIC INQUIRY
Richard Delgado* and David R. Millen*"
I. INTRODUCTION
In a recent survey of first amendment issues, Thomas Emerson lists
as one of the "hard problems... looming on the horizon" state regu-
lation of scientific research.' "Courts must soon decide," Emerson
writes, "whether certain kinds of ... research may be prohibited or
regulated. It is hard to predict where these issues will lead."'2
While Emerson chose as his example the recent moratorium de-
clared by the city of Cambridge on recombinant DNA research,3 the
first legal challenge could just as easily arise from proposals to limit
research on the XYY syndrome, 4 genetic differences in IQ among
population groups, 5 or behavioral implications of the emerging disci-
pline of sociobiology. 6
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I. Emerson, Colonial Intentions and Current Realities of the First Amendment,
125 U. PA. L. REv. 737, 746 (1977); see Toulmin, The Research and The Public In-
terest, in RESEARCH WITH RECOMBINANT DNA 101 (1977). "1 . . . would predict
that a case raising this question will probably reach the Supreme Court sometime dur-
ing the next fifteen years or so, and that the Court will probably decide that freedom
of speech does, at least in general terms, .embrace freedom of scientific inquiry." Id.
at 103.
2. Emerson, supra note 1, at 746-47.
3. Id. at 746 n.25.
4. E.g., Beckwith & Miller, The XYY male: The making of a myth, HARV. MAG-
AZINE, October 1976, at 30, 33 (arguing against XYY research because it distracts at-
tention from more pressing social problems such as poverty and racism; because like
all scientific investigation it occurs in a social context and inevitably influences and
is influenced by social policy); Davis, XYY: The Dangers of Regulating Research
by Adverse Publicity, HARV. MAGAZINE, October 1976, at 26 (public pressure led by
political groups caused abandonment of research project designed to see how XYY
syndrome affects health and behavior).
5. E.g., Reinhold, A Limit on Scholarship?, N.Y. Times, Dec. 9, 1973, at E-5,
col. 1; Wicker, The Shockley Case, N.Y. Times, Nov. 16, 1973, at A-41, col. 5; N.Y.
Times, Nov. 18, 1973, at A-20, col. 1. See generally THE I.Q. CONTROVERSY, CRITICAL
READINGS (J. Block & G. Dworkin eds. 1976) [hereinafter cited as I.Q. CONTROVERSY].
6. E.g., TIME, Aug. 1, 1977, at 54; id., Dec. 13, 1976, at 93.
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The movement to curb DNA research proceeds on two fronts. One
focuses on the threat to public health posed by the escape of newly
created, harmful micro-organisms. 7 This criticism invokes the state's
police power to protect the public health and safety; in so doing, it
presents few new legal problems except, possibly, the magnitude of
the risk.8 Another, equally insistent, line of attack, however, urges that
such research, even if safe, should not be carried out because it in-
volves the exercise of a power that human beings properly ought not
assume-the power to modify the evolutionary course of living spe-
cies, including, potentially, our own. 9
Other research, particularly that concerned with the genetics of hu-
man intelligence, 10 has generated criticism that is even more clearly
focused on the content or direction of the research rather than on any
tangible, immediate risk. Such research should not be carried out,
7. E.g., Bennett & Gurin, Science that Frightens Scientists: The Great Debate over
DNA, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, February 1977, at 43, 45. See generally SUBCOMMITTEE
ON HEALTH & SCIENCE RESEARCH OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RESOURCES,
95TH CONG., IST SESs., BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH AND THE PUBLIC ("AIRLIE CONFERENCE")
(Comm. Print 1977) [hereinafter cited as AIRLIE CONFERENCE].
8. The possible dangers, which include an epidemic of disease for which human
beings have no immune mechanisms, have been described as "horrific." See, e.g.,
Bennett & Gurin, supra note 7, at 45. Others have warned that DNA research could
lead to the cloning of human beings, or other forms of undesirable genetic engineer-
ing. Id. at 58-6 1. Because of these possibilities, it has been proposed that "informed
consent" be obtained from the public and that the decision to proceed with such
technologies be made by the widest possible social groups. See, e.g., RESEARCH WITH
RECOMBINANT DNA 188 (1977); Hearings on Regulation of Recombinant DNA Re-
search Before Subcomm. on Science, Technology, and Space of the Senate Comm. on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 117 (1977) (statement
of Marc Lapp6, Ph.D.) [hereinafter cited as Hearings]; Dismukes, Recombinant
DNA: A Proposal for Regulation, HASTINGS CENTER REP., April 1977, at 20, 25-27.
See also Brown, Informed Consent in Social Experimentation: Some Cautionary
Notes, in ETHICAL AND LEGAL ISSUES OF SOCIAL EXPERIMENTATION 79, 94-98 (Rivlin
& Timpane eds. 1975). Such an approach would be helpful in coping with the police-
power aspects of scientific inquiry-tangible, physical dangers to health and safety-
but would do little to assist in dealing with objections based on the content or direc-
tion of research.
9. E.g., AIRLIE CONFERENCE, supra note 7, at 44-45 (remarks of Robert Sin-
sheimer); id. at 89 (remarks of Jonathan King); Hearings, supra note 8, at 4 (state-
ment of Philip Handler) ("Their position, in short, is that there are some factors that
man should not seek to learn."). Grobstein, The Recombinant DNA Debate, SCIEN-
TIFIC AMER., July 1977, at 22, 29-30; Gumpert, Progress or Peril?: Gene Transplants
Stir Communities' Fears: Scientists Are Split, Wall St. J., Sept. 28, 1976, at 29, col. I
("There is the larger, philosophical question of whether researchers should be tamper-
ing with genetic material and creating new forms of life").
10. The prime advocates of the view that IQ is determined partly by member-
ship in racial subgroups are Arthur Jensen, professor of education at the Univer-
sity of California at Berkeley, and William Shockley, professor of engineering at
Stanford University. Their views are discussed in I.Q. CONTROVERSY, supra note 5.
See also sources cited at notes 17, 19, & 20 infra.
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critics urge, because the results could alter our political or social
values,11 change our concept of what it means to be a member of the
human community, 12 or result in a frozen, static view of society in
which the range of human potentialities is limited by pre-existing de-
sign. 13 At times, such criticism assumes a character that is overtly reli-
gious, moral, or political, as when opponents of DNA research ques-
tion man's tampering with nature's processes,' 4 or when critics of
sociobiology argue that the discipline supports a status quo that, in
their view, is racist, sexist, and elitist.' 5
The critics' voices have not gone entirely unheard. In addition to
the Cambridge moratorium, scientists have been denied research sup-
port,16 teaching opportunities,' 7 or, in the case of young researchers,
tenured positions' 8 because they have pursued lines of inquiry that
were seen by universities or grant-giving agencies as disfavored or
11. E.g., Chomsky, The Fallacy of Richard Herrnstein's IQ, in I.Q. CONTROVERSY,
supra note 5, at 285, 294-95.
12. E.g., Stent, The Poverty of Scientism & the Promise of Structuralist Ethics,
HASTINGS CENTER REP., December 1976, at 32; see Comment, Law vs. Science: Legal
Control of Genetic Research, 65 Ky. L. REV. 880, 891 n.76 (1977) (genetic engi-
neering is "a threat to human integrity, dignity, and individuality").
13. Lewontin, Race and Intelligence, BULL. ATOM. SCI., March 1970, at 2 (liken-
ing Jensen's view to 17th century notions of predestination and limited atonement);
Stent, supra note 12, at 32; N.Y. Times, Oct. 3, 1973, at A-48, col. 1 (New York
state education commissioner laments tendency of Jensen-Shockley view to cause
public to become "confused and dispirited" about education).
14. See sources cited at note 9 supra; Report of Workshop No. 10: Ethical and
Moral Issues of the Research, in RESEARCH WITH RECOMBINANT DNA 209-11 (1977);
Report of Town Meeting, in RESEARCH WITH RECOMBINANT DNA 211-14 (1977);
TIME, Apr. 18, 1977, at 32 ("Beyond any immediate danger, others say, there are vast
unknowns and moral implications. Do not intervene in evolution, they warn in effect,
because 'it's not nice to fool Mother Nature.' "). See also Smith, Manipulating the
Genetic Code: Jurisprudential Conundrums, 64 GEO. LJ. 697, 700 (1976); SCi.
NEws, Mar. 12, 1977, at 165 (opponents of DNA research demand inclusion of "re-
ligio'us leaders" in National Academy of Sciences forum). If the state's motive in
imposing a limitation on research is blatantly religious, it may be susceptible to an
attack on establishment grounds, as well as to a challenge based on free expression.
See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968); Friedman, The Federal Fetal Experi-
mentation Regulations: An Establishment Clause Analysis, 61 MINN. L. REV. 961
(1977).
15. Chasin, Sociobiology: A Sexist Synthesis, SCIENCE FOR THE PEOPLE, May-June
1977, at 27, 31; Gurin, Is Society Hereditary?, HARV. MAGAZINE, October 1976, at 21,
23; TIME, Dec. 13, 1976, at 93.
16. Davis, supra note 4, at 26; Reinhold, supra note 5; Gumpert, supra note 9;
see RESEARCH WITH RECOMBINANT DNA 136-37 (1977). See also Beckwith, Recom-
binant DNA: Does the Fault Lie Within our Genes?, SCIENCE FOR THE PEOPLE,
May-June 1977, at 14-15.
17. N.Y. Times, Dec. 2, 1973, atA-51, col. 1; id., Nov. 16, 1973, atA-41, col. 5; id.,
May 2, 1972, at 9, col. 1 (William Shockley denied opportunity to speak or teach
at Stanford, Princeton, Harvard).
18. TIME, Aug. 1, 1977, at 54 (leader of sociobiology movement denied tenure at
Harvard).
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sensitive. The faculties of eminent universities19 and the memberships
of prestigious scientific societies2 0 have heatedly debated the propri-
ety of pursuing scientific inquiry in certain highly charged areas.
This article examines the applicability of existing constitutional
doctrine to state action which prohibits, burdens, or declines to fund
scientific research, 2 1 not because of deficiencies in its research design,
the credentials of the investigator, safety or health hazards, or pro-
jected cost-benefit balance of the results, but because the state consid-
ers the area of inquiry itself inappropriate or suspect. This article ten-
ders and examines the thesis that governmental decisions to regulate
scientific inquiry because of the nature of the knowledge likely to
result implicate highly protected constitutional values, particularly
those of the first amendment, thereby invoking the stringent model of
judicial review applicable to such cases.
Although the state's power to regulate scientific activity in the pub-
lic interest, either through direct enactment or the power of the purse,
has yet to be tested in constitutional terms, it seems highly likely that
courts will be called upon to adjudicate such controversies in the near
future. A moratorium such as that recently imposed in Cambridge
could be challenged by a scientist in a declaratory judgment action as
19. See Reinhold, supra note 5, (University of California at Berkeley faculty
policy debated; requires researchers to consider "social risk" to their subjects); N.Y.
Times, Nov. 18, 1973, at A-20, col. 4 (speakers at NYU conference urged that views
linking race and IQ are unfit to discuss).
20. See TIME, Aug. 7, 1977, at 75 (prominent professors protest Jensen's election
to American Academy for the Advancement of Science); id., Dec. 13, 1976, at 93
(American Anthropological Association considers resolution that would condemn
sociobiology as "an attempt to justify genetically the sexist, racist, and elitist status
quo in human society"); N.Y. Times, Mar. 2, 1974, at A-32, col. 5 (American
Association for the Advancement of Science hears debate concerning "whether or not
there should be more research into the proposition of Dr. Arthur Jensen of the
University of California at Berkeley suggesting that blacks, on the average, are infe-
rior in intelligence to whites"; article cites "strong tendency to oppose such research
as unsuitable or meaningless" within National Academy of Sciences and on univer-
sity campuses). See also NEWSWEEK, July 3, 1950, at 15; 157 PUBLISHER'S WEEKLY
2739, 2739 (1950). Harvard astronomers conducted a campaign to force the pub-
lisher to withdraw Immanuel Velikovsky's book, Worlds in Collision, because its
ideas on the origin of the solar system while not demonstrably erroneous nonetheless
contradicted current orthodoxy; pressure had also been exerted on the Hayden Planetar-
ium to force cancellation of a program based on the book.
21. The exclusion of research capable of presenting immediate health and safety or
other police-power problems means that the type of research with which this article is
concerned will generally be basic or fundamental research. "Basic research" has been
defined as "original investigations for the advancement of scientific knowledge ... which
do not have specific [practical] objectives" or ends in view. NATIONAL SCIENCE BOARD,




a violation of her fundamental rights. A researcher denied public
money to pursue controversial studies could bring an action against
the governmental funding agency to compel adoption of nondiscrimi-
natory criteria for disbursing funds. A professor denied employment,
advancement, or tenure because his employer objected to the content
of his research could challenge the university's decision as a violation
of his academic freedom.
In any such proceeding, it will be analytically helpful to identify
the functional components of the inquiry with which the governmen-
tal action interferes. Ordinarily, scientific investigation begins with
fact-gathering; constitutional right-to-know and right-to-learn cases
thus become pertinent. It also involves the creation and dissemination
of ideas and information. Accordingly, cases relating to freedom of
thought and belief, and the right to speak and hear, are also relevant.
The investigation may involve experimentation; if so, the distinction
between speech and action enters into the analysis.
Two sets of background material are useful in the difficult task of
applying established legal doctrine to this developing area. The first
consists of historical documents and writings that shed light on the in-
tentions of the framers in enacting the first amendment. Did they un-
derstand scientific inquiry to be comprehended in the sphere of pro-
tected expression and, if so, to what extent? The second consists of
the interpretations that leading commentators have given the amend-
ment's scope and purpose. Emerson, for example, has identified four
values or objectives our system of free expression is designed to serve.
Meiklejohn has advanced a theory premised on the function of free
speech in a self-governing, democratic society. Others have advocated
more restrictive interpretations. These theories are reviewed to deter-
mine the manner in which they argue for or against the right to pursue
scientific inquiry as an aspect of free expression.
Throughout this article, a number of themes appear: scientific in-
quiry as expression or nonexpression, right or privilege, private ac-
tivity or public good, process or product. These themes form the
familiar conceptual battleground on which many first amendment
struggles have been waged.22 The conclusion is reached that all three
levels of analysis-constitutional history, first amendment theory, and
first amendment case law-support the inclusion of many forms of
22. See generally sources cited at notes 94, 109, & 110 infra.
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basic scientific research within the system of protected expression.
The article concludes by suggesting criteria by which the appropriate-
ness of extending such protection can be determined in individual
cases.
II. SCIENTIFIC INQUIRY AND THE CONSTITUTION:
THE COLONIAL UNDERSTANDING
The first amendment's terse text23 gives little aid to one who wishes
to ascertain whether and to what extent the scientific enterprise was
contemplated as falling within the system of free expression. Science
is not mentioned-but this is also true of literature,24 philosophy, 25
teaching,26 leafletting,27 and peaceful sit-ins of segregated facilities, 28
activities that the courts have held to be highly protected. In deciding
whether first amendment coverage should extend to scientific inquiry,
one helpful indicator is the beliefs and intentions of the framers as re-
vealed in historical documents and their personal correspondence and
writings, as well as more general works of literature and history that
reveal the mood and intellectual currents of the times.29
A. The Intellectual Milieu
Several colonial figures were leading exponents of Enlightenment
23. "Congress shall make no law ...abridging the freedom of speech. or of the
press .... U.S. CONST. amend. I.
24. United States v. Kennerley, 209 F. 119 (S.D.N.Y. 1913) (Ulysses case):
see Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684 (1950) (Lady Chatterley's
Lover).
25. See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968) (teaching of evolutionary
theory held protected by establishment clause); American Communications Ass'n v.
Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 395-97 (1950) (holding and disseminating communist beliefs
protected, but incitement to overthrow government susceptible to state sanction, pre-
vention); United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944) (Court will not examine
truth or falsity of unusual religious beliefs); West Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (orthodox political beliefs may not be prescribed).
26. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (state may not prohibit teaching
of foreign language in public schools); T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF
EXPRESSION 593-626 (1970) [hereinafter cited as SYSTEM].
27. Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
28. Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966).
29. Courts confronted with novel or difficult problems of constitutional con-
struction have resorted to analysis of constitutional history to determine the orig-
inal understanding of particular articles, clauses, or amendments. See, e.g., Commu-
nist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 147-48 (1961) (Black,
J., dissenting); cases cited at notes 46-47 infra.
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thought,30 the principal source of the American revolutionary spirit. 3'
Central to Enlightenment thought are the notions of toleration and
liberalism, and a concept of truth-seeking as a continual process sub-
ject to objective verification and correction. 32 Because these are also
some of the basic values of science, 33 the development and growing
influence of science during the same period reinforced the rationalis-
tic, anti-authoritarian tenor of social and political thought. Political
theory borrowed basic values and assumptions from science,34 while
politics contributed such metaphors as the "laws" which all physical
bodies were assumed to obey.35 John Locke believed that natural laws
for government could be derived empirically by studying nature. 36
Madison saw the United States Constitution as a gigantic machine for
the regulation of interest groups, by means of which the struggles
among social classes would be balanced by political structures in
much the same manner in which the physical universe remained in
equilibrium under the influence of the laws of dynamics discovered by
Newton.37
The principal impediments to the establishment of a rational politi-
cal system were conceived to be ignorance and authoritarianism, in-
fluences which the framers assumed would be overcome by the ad-
vancing spirit of science. 38 Galileo's trial and the succeeding decline
of the scientific spirit in the Mediterranean countries were on the
minds of educated persons as examples of the evils of censorship.3 9
Those evils were attacked in Milton's Areopagitica40 and Montes-
quieu's Spirit of Laws,4 1 two works widely read and discussed by co-
lonial thinkers. Areopagitica was written in response to a Parliamen-
30. See text accompanying notes 37, 51-53, & 58-94 infra.
31. B. HINDLE, THE PURSUIT OF SCIENCE IN REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA 1735-1789,
at 381-82 (1956); Emerson, supra note 1, at 737, 746-48.
32. See text accompanying notes 37, 51-53, & 58-94 infra.
33. E.g., R. HOFSTADTER & W. METZGER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF ACADEMIC FREE-
DOM IN THE UNITED STATES 61-62 (1955).
34. J. CROWTHER, FAMOUS AMERICAN MEN OF SCIENCE 138, 148-49 (1937); see
E. BURNS, JAMES MADISON: PHILOSOPHER OF THE CONSTITUTION 24-25 (1938).
35. J. CROWTHER, supra note 34, at 145 passim; B. HINDLE, supra note 3 1, at 381-
82; R. HOFSTADTER & W. METZGER, supra note 33, at 61-62.
36. J. CROWTHER, supra note 34, at 148.
37. Id. at 141; see E. BURNS, supra note 34, at 24-25.
38. D. PRICE, THE SCIENTIFIC ESTATE 86-88 (1965). See also sources cited at note
36 supra, and notes 53, 58-60, & 63-66 infra.
39. E.g., C. PATTERSON, THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES OF THOMAS JEFFERSON
188-89 (1953).
40. J. MILTON, AREOPAGITICA (1898).
41. C. DE MONTESQUIEU, SPIRIT OF LAWS (4th ed. London 1878).
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tary bill requiring the licensing of books. Montesquieu's work, a
systematic defense of personal and political liberty, sought to base a
doctrine of political liberalism on "the nature of things"42 and a view
of the universe-moral as well as physical-as inherently orderly.43
His book illustrates the influence of scientific ideas on political
thought; it borrows heavily from Descartes and Newton in such con-
cepts as the "motion" of bodies (political as well as physical) and the
insistence that all action is explainable in terms of uniform, universal
laws of conduct.44
B. Constitutional History and Documents
Colonial America's respect for science is illustrated by a letter from
the Continental Congress to the inhabitants of Quebec. In enumerat-
ing the virtues of free expression, the authors declared, "The impor-
tance of this consists, besides the advancement of truth, science,
morality, and the arts in general, in its diffusion of liberal sentiment
on the administration of Government, its ready communication of
thoughts between subjects, and its consequential promotion of union
among them."'45
This letter has been cited with approval by the Supreme Court in
Near v. Minnesota46 and Roth v. United States.47 In Near, the letter
was cited as evidence that the early colonials sought, through the
Constitution, to protect against the evils of censorship and prior re-
straint.48 In Roth, the Court faced the difficult problem of differenti-
ating obscenity from protected expression. In language seemingly
broad enough to include scientific discourse, the Court extended pro-
tection to "[a] 11 ideas having ... redeeming social importance." 49 A
concurring opinion by Chief Justice Warren suggested that scientific
speech is intended to be protected when he spoke of "[t] he line divid-
ing the salacious or pornographic from literature or science."50
42. M. WADDICOR, MONTESQUIEU AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF NATURAL LAW 192
(1970). See generally T. PANGLE, MONTESQUIEU'S PHILOSOPHY OF LIBERALISM (1973).
43. M. WADDICOR, supra note 42, at 46-65, 192.
44. Id. at 183, 185-92; see J. CROWTHER, supra note 34, at 142.
45. 1 JOURNAL OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 104, 108 (1904).
46. 283 U.S. 697, 717 (1931).
47. 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1967).
48. 283 U.S. at 716-17.
49. 354 U.S. at 484.
50. Id. at 495 (emphasis added).
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Other colonial writings also speak of scientific activity or truth-
seeking as components of the system of free expression. Jefferson's
Notes on Virginia51 declares that "truth is great and will prevail if left
to herself, and has nothing to fear from the conflict, unless by human
interposition disarmed of her natural weapons, free argument and de-
bate."52 Jefferson saw science as the paradigm of truth-seeking pro-
cesses; a government which bridled science bridled truth.
Galileo was sent to the Inquisition for affirming that the earth was a
sphere; the government had declared it to be as flat as a trencher, and
Galileo was obliged to abjure his error. This error, however, at length
prevailed, the earth became a globe, and Descartes declared it was
whirled round its axis by a vortex.
Fortunately, however:
The government in which [Descartes] lived was wise enough to see
that this was no question of civil jurisdiction, or we should all have
been involved by authority in vortices. In fact, the [vortex theory
has] been exploded .... What has been the effect [of such interfer-
ences with scientific freedom] ... ? To make one half the world fools,
and the other half hypocrites.53
A further indication of the importance the founders placed on sci-
entific activity is found in their treatment of inventors. The Records
of the Federal Convention of 178754 contain an early proposal that
would have vested in Congress the power "[t] o encourage, by proper
premiums and provisions, the advancement of useful knowledge and
discoveries." 55 This provision evolved in successive drafts into the
present patent clause,56 the purpose of which, according to the Su-
preme Court, is not to reward individual inventors but to encourage
the arts and sciences generally.57
The early colonials saw scientific progress as a point of national
pride; science could contribute to the comfort and well-being of the
citizenry and at the same time vindicate the progress of the young na-
51. 1 T. JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA (1801).
52. Id. at 453.
53. C. PATTERSON, THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 188-89
(1953) (citing III T. JEFFERSON, NOTES ON VIRGINIA 264 (1782)).
54. 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 (M. Farrand ed. 1911).
55. Id.at321.
56. See id. at 505, 506, 509, 570, 595.
57. Sinclair v. Interchemical Corp., 325 U.S. 327, 330-31 (1945).
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tion in the eyes of the world.58 They provided for courses in science
and medicine at schools and colleges;59 they also chartered scientific
bodies60 and relied on them heavily for advice on matters concerning
health, public works, and agriculture. 61 A letter circulated among
antifederalists opposed the proposed Constitution because it lacked a
Bill of Rights. 62 It warned that if measures were not taken to protect
the Revolution, then "genius drags heavily its iron chain-science is
neglected, and real merit flies to the shades for security." 63
C. Private Writings and Correspondence of the Framers
The private writings and correspondence of the framers give added
support to the thesis that freedom of scientific inquiry occupied a
prominent place in their scheme of values.
1. Jefferson
In a letter to Dr. Willard, Jefferson encouraged the nation's col-
lege-age youth to study science, describing liberty as "the great parent
of science" and declaring that "a nation will be great in both, always
in proportion as it is free."64 Elsewhere he described freedom as "the
first-born daughter of science," 65 and equated scientific progress with
forward development in government and morals. 66 His beloved Uni-
versity of Virginia was to be based on the "illimitable freedom of the
human mind" and was to include a medical school as well as a curric-
ulum rich in mathematics and natural science. 67 He was convinced
that nothing was so conducive to intellectual and moral development
as the study of science, and in language reminiscent of the account of
58. B. HINDLE, supra note 31, at 382.
59. R. HOFSTADTER & W. METZGER, supra note 33, at 194-95; see A. KOCH, MAD-
ISON'S "ADVICE TO MY COUNTRY" 35 (1966).
60. W. BELL, EARLY AMERICAN SCIENCE: NEEDS AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR STUDY 34
(1955); B. HINDLE, supra note 31, at 384. See generally R. BATES, SCIENTIFIC SO-
CIETIES IN THE UNITED STATES (1945).
61. W. BELL, supra note 60, at 34.
62. 1 THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 481 (B. Schwartz ed. 1971).
63. Id. at 482.
64. 3 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 17 (H. Washington ed. 1856) (emphasis
added).
65. 7 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 3 (P. Ford ed. 1867) (letter to
M. D'Ivernois).
66. Id. at 328-29 (letter to E. Gerry).
67. R. HOFSTADTER & W. METZGER, supra note 33, at 238-39.
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the education of philosopher kings in Plato's Republic he wrote,
"When your mind shall be well improved with science, nothing will be
necessary to place you in the highest points of view, but to pursue the
interests of your country.., with the purest integrity, the most chaste
honor." 68 Indeed, Jefferson concluded that the American reaction
against "monkish ignorance and superstition" in favor of the natural




Franklin was one of the leading experimental scientists of his day.70
His studies embraced electricity, 71 magnetism,72 light,73 sound,74
geology,75 and human and animal physiology.76 His papers were read
before learned societies in many countries and translated into several
foreign languages. 77 He founded, with Jefferson, the American Philo-
sophical Society, whose members included leading colonial scientists
and intellectuals.78 The organization's charter was granted in 1743 by
the Pennsylvania General Assembly and signed by clerk Thomas
Paine.79 Like Jefferson, Franklin wrote of the importance of includ-
ing mathematical and scientific training in the curricula of colonial
schools and universities, urging that these studies would help students
develop habits of tolerance, practicality, and respect for truth.80 Al-
though as a careful experimentalist he avoided overliteral importation
of Newtonian metaphors into political theory, 81 it is clear that he be-
lieved in a physically and politically ordered universe, with science as
the method by which this order was to be ascertained.
68. C. BROWNE, THOMAS JEFFERSON AND THE SCIENTIFIC TRENDS OF His TIMES
59(1943).
69. D. PRICE, THE SCIENTIFIC ESTATE 88 (1965) (citing and quoting letter to R.
Weightman).
70. J. CROWTHER, supra note 34, at 151.
71. 5 THE WORKS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 179-80 (J. Sparks ed. 1840).
72. 6 ld. at 57 1.
73. Id. at 114.
74. Id. at 250.
75. Id. at 1.
76. Id. at 222, 275.
77. 2 W. BRUCE, BENJAMIN FRANKLIN SELF-REVEALED 354-55 (1923).
78. D. PRICE, supra note 69, at 87.
79. Id.
80. B. FRANKLIN, PROPOSALS RELATING TO THE EDUCATION OF YOUTH IN PENSILVANIA
[sic] (U. Pa. ed. 1931).




A thoroughgoing rationalist and exponent of Enlightenment
thought, Madison conceived of the Constitution in Newtonian terms,
as a collection of devices to balance and to maintain equilibrium
among opposing groups and forces. 82 Among these devices was the
first amendment, of which Madison was the principal author.83 He
worked with Thomas Jefferson in planning the University of Virginia,
a strictly secular institution which would serve as a "temple dedicated
to science and liberty."84 Outside politics, his chief interests were sci-
ence and philosophy. 85 He read widely the work of Pascal, Montes-
quieu, Locke, and other leading natural scientists and economists. 86
He carried out his own investigations of natural history, 87 and at his
death there was found among his papers an unfinished essay titled
The Symmetry of Nature, in which he described the harmony of the
physical and human realms under the universal rule of law. 88 His
maxim was "Dare to Know." 89 He saw the scientific method as offer-
ing the only sure guide to progress in both social and physical
spheres. 90
4. Other colonial leaders
Other leading colonial figures evidenced in either their personal
lives or their writings the same respect for science held by Franklin,
Jefferson, and Madison. Adams and Taylor corresponded about con-
stitutional arrangements, agreeing that the idea of checks and bal-
ances borrowed from physical theory offered the best hope for politi-
cal stability.91 Adams was influenced by the work of Montesquieu,
whose book applied Cartesian and Newtonian ideas to sociopolitical
problems. 92 Rush, an eminent physician and signer of the Declaration
82. Id. at 141.
83. M. MEYERS, THE MIND OF THE FOUNDER: SOURCE OF THE POLITICAL THOUGHT
OF JAMES MADISON 211 (1973).
84. A. KOCH, supra note 59, at 35.
85. E. BURNS, supra note 34, at 24.
86. Id. at 24-25, 47, 63, 125, & 175-84.
87. Id. at 25.
88. Id.
89. A. KOCH, supra note 59, at 13.
90. Id.
91. J. CROWTHER, supra note 34, at 135-37.
92. Id. at 142.
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of Independence, served as trustee of Princeton University, an early
center of scientific education and liberal thought.93
Scientific ideas and the scientific spirit were thus central to the
thinking of leading colonial figures and integral to the Revolutionary
idea. The political thinking of the colonial era was steeped in the heri-
tage of the Enlightenment, including the ideals of liberty, zeal for
truth-seeking, humility in the face of error, and hatred of authoritari-
anism. Many of the Revolution's leaders and theorists were leading sci-
entists in their own right; others borrowed from the prevailing scien-
tific climate metaphors and assumptions which they applied to poli-
tics, sometimes almost uncritically. Science served as the model of
truth-seeking activity; it lay at the heart of any system of free expres-
sion. As a result it seems highly unlikely that the framers intended to
protect areas of endeavor such as literature, political speech, or reli-
gion, while science languished unprotected, subject to regulation at
the uncontrolled discretion of the government.9 4
III. SCIENCE AND THE THEORETICAL RATIONALES
OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Constitutional history and the part-whole analysis tendered in the
next section suggest that the first amendment protects scientific in-
quiry. It remains, however, that the two cases that posed the issue of
science's status under the Constitution most clearly, Scopes v.
State95 and Epperson v. Arkansas,96 were finally decided on other
grounds. In the absence of a clear mandate in existing case law, it may
be expected that courts confronted with determining the degree of
protection to be afforded scientific research will turn to the writings
of leading commentators on the fundamental values and policies un-
derlying our system of free expression.
93. R. HOFSTADTER & W. METZGER, supra note 33, at 217-18.
94. See Z. CHAFEE, FREEDOM OF SPEECH (1920). Chafee regarded it as incontro-
vertible that the framers saw science as a first amendment activity:
It is all very well to say that religious views should be free; that scientific investiga-
tion should be free; but that political opinion cannot be free, because that is dan-
gerous .... Three centuries ago, people felt just as strongly about religious views
and about scientific investigation as they do now about political investigation ....
On that we must have just as much freedom of investigation as in the old days
was necessary for scientific discoveries.
Id. at 370.
95. 154 Tenn. 105, 289 S.W. 363 (1927).
96. 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
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Scholarly writing on the first amendment takes place in a threefold
matrix, consisting of (i) the scope of protection, that is, what is speech
and what is not;9 7 (ii) the degree or extent of protection to be afforded
speech of various types;98 and (iii) the stringency of review appropri-
ate when protected speech has been infringed: is this protection abso-
lute or may it be balanced against other interests? 99 These categories
often overlap; for example, theorists who advocate a broad scope of
protection for speech and speech-like conduct are frequently absolu-
tists who oppose the idea that the interest in free expression might be
overridden by countervailing concerns. The first issue-scope of pro-
tected activity-is the prime concern of this article, although types of
speech and standards of review are discussed briefly in the final sec-
tion.100
A. "Broad Scope" Views
The current judicial trend is toward a wide scope of protection for
expression.' 01 The leading theorists for this view are Emerson and
Meiklejohn, each of whom, on different bases, ends by espousing a
"broad scope" position.
1. Emerson
Thomas Emerson, in his article, Toward a General Theory of the
First Amendment, 10 2 and his book, The System of Freedom of Ex-
pression,03 gives the most comprehensive exposition of a broad view
of the purposes and extent of freedom of expression. Freedom of ex-
pression in a democratic society has four premises, based on funda-
mental values which we hold and which the first amendment is
designed to protect:
(i) Freedom of expression advances individual self-fulfillment. The
proper end of man is the realization of his character and poten-
97. SYSTEM, supra note 26, at 43; Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First
Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 939 (1963) (mixed speech-action cases) [hereinafter
cited as General Theory].
98. General Theory, supra note 97, at 937-39 (obscenity).
99. Id. at 909-16.
100. See notes 189-95, 201-07, 214-16, & 296-97 and accompanying text infra.
101. E.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 34 (1973).
102. General Theory, supra note 97.
103. SYSTEM, supra note 26.
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tialities. For this the mind must be free, and this freedom in-
cludes the ability to express one's thoughts and ideas without
restriction.
(ii) Freedom of expression serves to advance knowledge and discover
the truth.
(iii) Freedom of expression allows participation in decisionmaking by
all members of society. This is important in the political sphere
but extends to other areas as well.
(iv) Freedom of expression is a means of assuring a society that is
acceptable to its members and therefore stable. It facilitates
orderly change.0 4
Emerson's first rationale, individual self-fulfillment, was cited in
Police Department v. Mosley,10 5 in which the Supreme Court de-
clared, "To permit the continued building of our politics and culture,
and to assure self-fulfillment for each individual, our people are guar-
anteed the right to express any thought, free from government censor-
ship. 10 6 The second rationale is the familiar "marketplace of ideas"
justification put forward by John Stuart Mill and many court
opinions.' 07 The third rationale stems from the principles of self-gov-
ernment-to vote intelligently, the citizenry of a democratic society
must be well informed on all matters. 108 The fourth is more an aspect
of the third than an independent rationale. In protecting the citizen's
access to the channels of social change, it assures that the government
is seen as legitimate and responsive to the wishes of its constituents.109
104. See General Theory, supra note 97, at 878-86; SYSTEM, supra note 26, at 6-8.
105. 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
106. Id. at 96-97.
107. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957); J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY
13-48 (R. B. McCallum ed. 1948); see Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589,
603 (1967).
108. Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. at 96-97; A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREE-
DoM (1960) [hereinafter cited as POLITICAL FREEDOM]; see 26 NAT'L SCIENCE FOUNDA-
TION ANN. REP. (1976). "Because one of our clear goals is a scientifically enlightened
citizenry, competent to deal with important policy issues in science and technology, I
believe we must give serious consideration to broadening and extending our science
education programs at the secondary level . Id. at xiii (statement of acting NSF
director Richard C. Atkinson).
109. Emerson's analysis is not beyond criticism. One difficulty, which he con-
cedes, SYSTEM, supra note 26, at 7, is that his four premises have never been proved
and perhaps cannot be. He asserts, nevertheless, that we hold them. Id. at 8. Freedom
of expression is necessary, he says, to accomplish four objectives; omitted is; "and we
must accomplish these four objectives because (X)." What is the missing reason, X?
Meiklejohn suggests an answer: the American polity is characterized by our compact
with each other-we associate as friends and members of a union, not as stronger and
weaker, ruler and ruled. Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SuP.
CT. REV. 245, 263-65 [hereinafter cited as The First Amendment] ; see POLITICAL FREE-
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a. Assuring self-fulfillment and the realization of individual potential
The right to self-fulfillment, which inheres in persons "in [their]
capacity as . . . individual [s] ,110 exists, according to Emerson, to
permit them to develop fully their character and potentialities as hu-
man beings.1 ' The human race is distinguished from the rest of the
animal kingdom by the ability to think, to reason, and to build a cul-
ture. 112 It is through the exercise of our cognitive and expressive
faculties that men and women find meaning in existence; it is through
these faculties that persons become fully human.1 13
For serious scientists, science is a fully engrossing endeavor that
may constitute the principal creative outlet of their lives. 114 Einstein
has written that his work represented for him a way of approaching
the ultimate mysteries of the universe. 115 Pasteur saw the joy of scien-
DOM, supra note 108, at 14-18. Emerson, however, leaves this question unanswered. Other
omissions include whether or not accomplishment of his four objectives is a goal out-
weighing other concerns, and whether freedom of expression as a means of achieving
them is not to be superseded by any other means.
Further, Emerson's system treats freedom of expression as a means to certain ends;
it has instrumental value. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-1, at
576-77 (1978) (criticizing Emerson's instrumental approach as inadequate). Because
this is so, cases could arise in which the exercise of free expression would inhibit the at-
tainment of one or more of these ends. Just as in the economic marketplace, dispari-
ties can appear which hinder the operation of the "invisible hand," so in the market-
place of ideas, truth may not always prevail. Id. at 577. One person's self-fulfillment
may restrict another's. Free advocacy of particular ideas may temporarily cause more
unrest than orderly change. Emerson does not tell us how to resolve these difficulties,
and to the extent they remain unaddressed, his approach is weakened. Nevertheless,
Emerson's writings are a scholarly and systematic attempt to explicate the values that
underlie our system of free expression, and any attempt to assess science's status within
that system must take account of his views.
110. General Theory, supra note 97, at 879.
111. Id.; see Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 372, 375 (1926) (Brandeis, J., con-
curring).
112. General Theory, supra note 97, at 879.
113. Id. at 879-80.
114. E.g., B. NOLTINGK, THE ART OF RESEARCH (1965).
The exhilaration, then, that can be engendered by a successfully accomplished
piece of research, is akin to that of the artist or composer. The poet wrestles with
his words until at last they are obedient to him and he knows that something of
his vision is enshrined in them. He has achieved. The scientist, no less, by his pa-
tience and ingenuity in marshalling the factors so that simple conclusions can be
drawn from complex data, has achieved a specific aim. ... Those who are gripped
by the wonder of the universe around them, possessed of a restless curiosity and
a bent to analyze, keen to pit the strength of their minds in siege against the mys-
teries that have held out longest ... will find the pursuit of pure science a com-
pelling and inspiring exercise.
Id. at 4. See also W. BEVERIDGE, THE ART OF SCIENTIFIC INVESTIGATION 92-93, 178
n.95, 190, 193 (1957) (joy of the scientist in discovery).
115. L. BARNETT, THE UNIVERSE AND DR. EINSTEIN (1948).
The most beautiful and most profound emotion we can experience is the sensation
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tific discovery as "the greatest that can be felt by a human soul. 11 6
To use any means to deny such individuals the opportunity to pursue
their profession inhibits them in ways that are central to their exis-
tence as human beings.
The individual right to free thought and expression also has a social
aspect."1 7 Because man is a social animal, Emerson writes, he must
remain free to join with others in creating a common culture and ex-
perience.1 1s The obligation which individuals have in our culture to
cooperate with their fellows has a counterpart in the obligation of so-
ciety to permit individuals to express their views, to communicate,
and to share in common decisions." 9 Denying scientific investigators
the right of free inquiry inhibits their ability to participate in an im-
portant form of societal decisionmaking. Scientific advances shape
our society in countless ways; our very view of ourselves is colored by
discoveries in astronomy, biology, medicine, and psychology, to name
but a few of the more obvious disciplines. 20 Advances in these fields
often have what Professor Tribe has called a "reconstitutive" compo-
nent-they alter our perception of ourselves as individuals or as a so-
ciety.' 21 To deny scientists the opportunity to work toward such ad-
vances deprives them of the primary means by which they may work
to expand or shape the culture in which they live.
b. Attainment of truth
In expounding his second rationale, attainment of truth, Emerson
sees the system of free expression as a means by which society is
provided with new ideas and knowledge. 22 This rationale is premised
of the mystical .... To know that what is impenetrable to us really exists, mani-
festing itself as the highest wisdom and the most radiant beauty which our dull
faculties can comprehend only in their most primitive forms-this knowledge, this
feeling is at the center of true religiousness.
•.. The cosmic religious experience is the strongest and noblest maifispring of
scientific research.
Id. at 105.
116. W. BEVERIDGE, supra note 114, at 193.
117. General Theory, supra note 97, at 880.
118. Id.
119. id.
120. See generally L. TRIBE, CHANNELING TECHNOLOGY THROUGH LAW (1973).
121. Tribe, Technology Assessment and the Fourth Discontinuity: The Limits of
Instrumental Rationality, 46 S. CAL. L. REV. 617 (1972).
122. General Theory, supra note 97, at 881; see Whitney v. California, 274 U.S.
372, 375-77 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
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on the belief that the best guarantee of reaching a sound opinion or
belief lies in assuring that all views receive a fair hearing, that none
will be suppressed. 123 This goal demands that discussion never be
closed, that ideas remain subject to criticism and testing.
Because scientific inquiry is a prime means by which new ideas are
generated in our society, the goal of attaining the truth requires that
scientific inquiry be protected. Without such protection, ideas or
areas of research may be labeled dangerous or sensitive, resulting in
the withering of entire lines of inquiry.124 History contains many ex-
amples of governmental or ecclesiastical suppression of scientific in-
quiry; rarely, if ever, has society benefited.125
Like the goal of individual self-fulfillment, that of truth-seeking has
a social aspect. 126 Free access to ideas and encouragement of the cre-
ation of new ones facilitates the formation of group judgments or
consensuses essential for social cohesiveness. 127 Because collective
judgments are made up of individual ones, encouraging a process by
which individuals arrive at reliable views and opinions contributes to
the formation of the shared views that society needs to function suc-
cessfully. It is evident that scientific inquiry serves this purpose. A
decision to criminalize or decriminalize a drug, for example, ought to
take into account its effects on the human organism; a decision to de-
rive energy from certain sources requires information about the con-
sequences of various alternatives. Without scientific ideas and
information these decisions cannot be made wisely; debate proceeds
in a vacuum. The goal of attaining the truth, therefore, like that of
achieving individual fulfillment, requires that scientific inquiry be
brought within the system of protected expression.
c. Participation in decisionmaking
Because our society has rejected the notion of government by an
123. General Theory, supra note 97, at 881-82.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 882; Singer, The Involvement of Scientists, in RESEARCH WITH RECOM-
BINANT DNA 24, 29 (1977) ('The consequences of attempts to restrain the search
for knowledge have been more fearsome than the science fiction scenarios constructed
by genetic fear mongers."). See generally Stettin, Freedom of Inquiry, 81 GENETICS
415 (1975).
126. General Theory, supra note 97, at 882.
127. Id.
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elite, freedom of thought and of discussion must be permitted to en-
able decisions to be made which truly reflect the will of the commu-
nity. 128 Although this need is particularly acute in connection with po-
litical decisions, Emerson argues that the principle extends to include
"religion, literature, art, science and all areas of human learning and
knowledge." 129 It is in the political sphere that the government has the
greatest stake in repressing ideas; as a result, it is here that the
majority of battles have been fought. But open discussion of new
ideas must be protected whenever they touch on "the building of the
... culture" as a whole.' 30 Because science is a major determinant of
that culture as well as a supplier of the information necessary for the
intelligent resolution of disputes that are expressly political, it should
be entitled to protection under Emerson's third rationale.
d. Striking a balance between stability and peaceful change
Freedom of expression enables a society to achieve the twin goals
of assuring stability and providing the mechanisms of peaceful
change-of maintaining the "precarious balance between healthy
cleavage and necessary consensus."' 3 ' Repression of ideas breeds re-
sentment; underneath apparent conformity there lies "an intense, in-
cessant, implacable doubt.' 32 Open discussion allows the losing side
to "let off steam" and provides the assurance that if one's view has not
prevailed, it has at least been heard. 133
This principle applies at least as much to science as to other forms
of human endeavor and expression. When civil authority suppresses
scientific investigation, stability is achieved at the price of stagna-
tion,'34 if not lost to outright revolt. 3 5 Galileo and Lysenko are two
128. Id. at 882-84.
129. Id. at 883.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 884-86.
132. W. BAGEHOUT, The Metaphysical Basis of Toleration, in 2 WORKS OF WALTER
BAGEHOUT 339, 357 (Hutton ed. 1889).
133. General Theory, supra note 97, at 885.
134. See Douglas, Preface to Symposium on Law & Technology, 45 S. CAL. L.
REV. at v (1972) ("A scientist, like a poet, must have full first amendment freedoms.
Otherwise, he extolls the virtues of those in power and knuckles under- to do their
immediate desires."); Lederberg, The Freedoms and the Control of Science: Notes
from the Ivory Tower, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 596, 596 (1972).
135. E.g., Stettin, Freedom of Inquiry, 81 GENETICS 415, 416 (1975); see Bennett
& Gurin, Science that Frightens Scientists: The Great Debate over DNA, ATLANTIC
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of the better known examples. Already, in connection with the DNA
controversy, predictions have been made that curtailing research be-
yond the degree necessary to provide for health and safety will cause
ambitious and dedicated researchers to go underground, 136 or con-
tinue their research in countries where scientific inquiry is less highly
regulated. 137 Considerations of freedom of expression as an aspect of
orderly change and the promotion of governmental legitimacy thus
are as applicable to science as they are to areas that we expressly pro-
tect.
2. Meiklejohn
A second proponent of the "broad view" position is Alexander
Meiklejohn, whose article, The First Amendment is an Absolute 38
and book, Political Freedom, 39 set forth a view of the first amend-
ment based on the needs of self-government. "The first amendment,"
he writes, "does not protect a 'freedom to speak.' It protects the free-
dom of those activities of thought and communication by which we
'govern.' It is concerned not with a private right, but with a public
power, a governmental responsibility."'140
"We, the people," are a self-governing community.' 4 ' According to
Meiklejohn, this means that we must have access to information and
opinion and be free to discuss these with each other.142 These needs
are self-evident requirements of government by a community. To se-
MONTHLY, February 1977, at 43, 61; Grobstein, Recombinant DNA Research: Beyond
the NIH Guidelines, 194 SCIENCE 1133 (1976).
136. University of Washington Daily, Mar. 9, 1977, at 3, col. 1 (chairperson of
campus DNA committee warns that excessive regulation will simply cause research-
ers to go underground); Comment, supra note 12, at 887 (citing Wade, Gene-Splicing:
At Grass Roots Level a Hundred Flowers Bloom, 195 SCIENCE 558 (1977)). Such
underground experimentation would be even more difficult to control for the purposes
of public health and safety.
137. See Watson, In Defense of DNA, NEW REPUBLIC, June 25, 1977, at 11.
DNA research is condemned to be impressed in chains . . . our only hope can be
that Europe and the Eastern Bloc will not follow our madness. Perhaps when we
see that no Andromeda strain or doomsday bug has been produced abroad, but
that progress continues to be made, the United States will resume free inquiry.
Id. at 14.
138. The First Amendment, supra note 109.
139. POLITICAL FREEDOM, supra note 108.
140. The First Amendment, supra note 109, at 255.
141. POLITICAL FREEDOM, supra note 108, at 14-19.
142. Id. at 25-27.
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cure these rights from encroachment by our delegated agents, the gov-
ernment, we have the first amendment. The subjects of a monarch or
tyrant could also be granted a "freedom of speech," but their freedom
would be of a different kind because it would not have its origin in a
self-governing community.
Free speech assumes its protected status because it is an essential
component of intelligent self-government-not essential as a means to
an end, but rather because this is what self-government consists of.' 43
We are constituted by the manner in which we agree to "speak" to one
another; this agreement creates our polity.
Meiklejohn's emphasis on governing could be taken to mean that
the first amendment applies only to political speech, such as criticisms
of laws, leaders, and national policy. But Meiklejohn expressly rejects
this narrow interpretation.'4 There are many forms of thought and
expression from which the voter acquires the ability and the intelli-
gence to form wise judgments. These include "[t] he achievements of
philosophy and the sciences in creating knowledge and understanding
of men and their world," which achievements "must be made avail-
able, without abridgement to every citizen."'145 Unless these are pro-
tected, citizens will not be able to participate fully and actively in the
affairs of the nation. The right of free expression must therefore
extend to these areas as well. Meildejohn's view of first amendment
purposes, like Emerson's, thus implies that scientific inquiry deserves
protection as an aspect of our system of free expression.
B.. The "Narrow Scope" View
Emerson and Meiklejohn represent the majority position among
scholars concerning the scope of first amendment protection, al-
though some commentators and not a few courts take issue with their
absolutist approach to the degree of protection afforded. The main
advocate of the opposing "narrow scope" view in recent years has
been Robert Bork, whose article, Neutral Principles and Some First
Amendment Problems,146 published in 1971, urges that constitutional
143. Id. at 8-28 ('The Rulers and the Ruled").
144. The First Amendment, supra note 109, at 256-57.
145. Id.




protection be accorded only speech that is expressly political.' 47
Conceding that this view "departs drastically" from the mainstream
position, Bork urges that outside the realm of political speech, the
majority should be free to regulate speech as it chooses.148 This view
is based largely on his belief that as a nondemocratic institution, the
Supreme Court should not attempt to impose its view on the major-
ity. 149 Unless the Constitution clearly mandates protection for a given
type of speech, Bork urges, the Court may not legitimately tell the
majority what it must hear.
Although Bork briefly adverts to science as an activity which falls
outside any "principled stopping point,"' 5 0 it is clear that his main
target is pornography. Because pornography is nonpolitical, it may be
regulated as the community sees fit.' 5 ' Echoes of this view appear in
some of the "balancing" cases, a few of which hint that political
speech is more protected than other types. Young v. American Mini
Theatres, Inc.,' 52 for example, declares: "It is manifest that society's
interest in protecting this type of expression [erotic material] is of a
wholly different, and lesser magnitude than the interest in untram-
melled political debate."' 153
How will those who advocate that speech is more protectible the
more it approaches political discourse view scientific speech? It is dif-
ficult to predict the implications of Bork's view for such speech and
activity. Scientific utterances are certainly more like political speech
than is pornography, yet they clearly are not expressly political. Still,
science often affects national policy in significant ways. 54 Scientists
supply the information on which intelligent resolution of many politi-
cal judgments rests.' 55 Scientific information also will often be neces-
sary to enable speech of a political-or any other-nature to be effec-
tive. Because science supplies the evidentiary material needed to
support claims and opinions, 56 and because no listener is likely to be-
147. ld. at 20.
148. Id. at 6, 20-32.
149. Id. at 6-7.
150. Id. at 27.
151. Id. at 23-29.
152. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
153. Id. at 70.
154. See notes 122-34, 144-45 and accompanying text supra; note 166 and ac-
companying text infra.
155. Id.
156. Compare Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 n.ll (1955), with
In re Quinlan, 70 NJ. 10, 355 A.2d 647, 653-60 (1976). Scientific and medical infor-
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lieve opinions unsupported by evidence, depriving a speaker of access
to the evidence he needs effectively deprives him of being taken seri-
ously. Even on the narrow view, therefore, a strong case can be made
for affording scientific speech and activity protection under the first
amendment. It thus appears that the major views of the first amend-
ment that have been set forth by modern commentators incline to-
ward first amendment protection of the right to engage in scientific re-
search and inquiry.
IV. SCIENCE AND THE CASE LAW: FUNCTIONAL AND
CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
Although the Court has never specifically considered the scientist's
right to conduct basic research, it has dealt with most, if not all, of the
elements of the scientific process. 157 The precise components of a
given scientific investigation will vary depending on the discipline, the
problem under study, and the researcher's choice of methodology. In
general, however, the process will include many of the following ele-
ments: thinking, consulting with colleagues, experimentation, publish-
ing results, and teaching. The process is a continuous cycle; it can be
interrupted by interference with any of the component activities. 58
New ideas and theories are often sparked by experimentation or by
discussion of the research results of colleagues. The testing of one hy-
pothesis may unexpectedly produce evidence suggesting a completely
different theory or casting doubt on an established principle. Because
of this interconnectedness, each stage of the process must be protected
if the entire enterprise is to be protected. Conversely, if each step in
the process is protected, the whole must be protected as well.159
mation was used to support claims regarding effects of segregated schooling on chil-
dren in Brown, and regarding privacy-based rights of comatose, dying patients in
Quinlan.
157. The authors are indebted to Robert B. McKinstry, Jr., who proposed such a
functional analysis in an unpublished paper, Constitutional Problems of the Regulation
of DNA Recombinant Experimentation (May 9, 1976) (seminar paper, Yale Law
School) (copy on file with Washington Law Review).
158. See text accompanying note 239 infra.
159. Part-whole analyses are sometimes criticized for ignoring the possibility that
the whole may be greater than the sum of its parts. Living organisms, for example,
are more than their inert components taken together. The assumption that the behavior
of complex organisms or systems may be deduced from the laws governing their parts
has been called the "reductionist fallacy." It is also possible to mention activities-
conspiracies, for instance-each element of which is protected but which as a whole
pose peculiar problems demanding special treatment. These wholes may be less than
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A. The Scientific Process: First Amendment Analysis
1. Firsthand experience: creation and discovery of information
a. Mentation
Generation of an idea is the initial step in each cycle of the scien-
tific process. Based on accumulated experience or intuition, the scien-
tist posits a theory or hypothesis. This part of the process should, by
its very nature, be beyond the control of government. One Supreme
Court Justice wrote that "[f] reedom to think is absolute of its own
nature; the most tyrannical government is powerless to control the in-
ward workings of the mind." 160 This statement, perhaps self-evident
in 1941, is less axiomatic today. The advent of psychosurgery and so-
phisticated brainwashing techniques renders the "inward workings of
the mind" vulnerable to invasion, modification, and control. 161
The problem is beginning to come before the courts; 162 it is impor-
tant, therefore, to note that the Supreme Court has spoken directly to
the sum of their parts. While recognizing the dangers inherent in part-whole reasoning.
the authors nevertheless believe that a useful beginning for determining the appro-
priate degree of constitutional protection due a complex process like scientific research
can be made by examining the status of its component parts.
160. Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 618 (1941) (Murphy. J., dissenting), vacated.
319 U.S. 103 (1943).
161. See Shapiro, Legislating the Control of Behavior Control: Autonomy and
the Coercive Use of Organic Therapies, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 237 (1974).
162. A lower court decision directly on point is Kaimowitz v. Department of Men-
tal Health, Civil No. 73-19434-AW (Cir. Ct. Wayne County, Mich., July 10. 1973).
reprinted in 1 ABA MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP. 147 (1976) (copy of original opinion
on file with Washington Law Review). Kaimowitz involved a "criminal sexual psycho-
path" allegedly subjected illegally to experimental psychosurgery. The court held that
"[a] person's mental processes, the communication of ideas, and the generation of
ideas, come within the ambit of the First Amendment. To the extent that the First
Amendment protects the dissemination of ideas and the expression of thoughts, it
equally must protect the individual's right to generate ideas." 1 ABA MENTAL DISABIL-
ITY L. REP. at 15 1. See generally Shapiro, supra note 16 1, at 258 & nn.55-57.
It is unlikely that a government would attempt to control a scientist's work by sub-
jecting her to psychosurgery; nevertheless, Kaimowitz reaffirms the notion that men-
tation enjoys the full protections of the first amendment. The court in Kaimowitz also
found a protection grounded in the due process right to privacy. For a discussion of
that aspect of the opinion, see notes 251-52 and accompanying text infra.
The Kairnowitz court relied in part on Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969), in
which the Court stated, "Whatever the power of the state to control public dissemina-
tion of ideas inimical to the public morality, it cannot constitutionally premise legis-
lation on the desirability of controlling a person's private thoughts." Id. at 566.
This notion finds analogous expression in criminal law in the principle that people
may not be criminally punished for what they think; a mens rea (guilty mind) must
be coupled with an actus reus (culpable deed) before criminal sanctions may be im-
posed. E.g., R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 741-42 (2d ed. 1969).
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the issue. Freedom of thought, though not expressly mentioned in the
first amendment (in 1791, who would have thought the problem
would ever arise?), has uniformly been held to be an essential con-
comitant of freedom of expression. 163 One cannot speak without first
having thought of something to say.
b. Experimentation
Once the scientist has developed a hypothesis, the next task is test-
ing it. This step generally involves gathering information through ex-
perimentation: the geneticist reconstructs E. coli, the sociologist
conducts surveys and interviews. At this point, the process moves
from the relatively inaccessible domain of the mind and becomes
physical action, traditionally susceptible of government regulation
and prohibition. 64
In the conduct of their affairs, scientists enjoy the same freedoms
and are subject to the same limitations as other citizens. The most sig-
nificant of these limitations is the police power. Reserved to the states
under our constitutional system, 165 this power enables states to enact
statutes and take action to promote "the peace, good order, morals,
163. See, e.g., Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937), in which Justice Car-
dozo, in dictum, wrote that "freedom of thought and speech . . . is the matrix, the
indispensable condition, of nearly every other form of freedom. With rare aberra-
tions a pervasive recognition of that truth can be traced in our history, political and
legal." Id. at 326-27.
164. "[T]raditional law has developed a fashion of controlling only the power
actually in our hands. We distinguish between physical acts on the one hand, and
speech or thoughts on the other .... " Lederberg, supra note 134, at 606-07. The
dichotomy between speech and action has been criticized by writers as simplistic and
conclusory: attaching the label "action" to a course of conduct avoids the necessity of
confronting the policy choices inherent in the situation before the court. See Note,
The Public Forum: Minimum Access, Equal Access, and the First Amendment, 28
STAN. L. REv. 117, 126 n.58 (1975); cf. the "symbolic speech" cases, e.g., Spence v.
Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409-10 (1974) (although display of American flag with
superimposed peace symbol was conduct, not speech, such conduct was protected
because it was "essentially" a form of expression). In United States v. O'Brien, 391
U.S. 367 (1968), the Court applied what it called the "same course of conduct" test
to uphold convictions for draft card burning by antiwar protesters: "[W] hen 'speech'
and 'nonspeech' elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently
important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify inci-
dental limitations on First Amendment freedoms." Id. at 376 (emphasis added).
165. To the extent that the federal government does become involved in "police-
power" protection of public health and safety, it does so under the commerce clause,
see Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824); Green, The Risk-Benefit Calculus
in Safety Determinations, 43 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 791, 794-95 n.6 (1975), and the
general welfare clause, see Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937); Steward Mach.
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and health of the community."'166 The police power is not without
limits; it is "subordinate to constitutional limitations .... Under it
there is no unrestricted authority to accomplish whatever the public
may presently desire." 167 Moreover, the power only enables states to
interfere with the conduct of individuals to the extent necessary to se-
Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937); Chapman & Talmadge, Historical and Political
Background of Federal Health Care Legislation, 35 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 334, 342
(1970).
166. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 145-46 (1876). Almost all formulations of
the proper concerns of the police power include a reference to the public morality.
Conceivably, government regulation of science might be framed in terms of protecting
the public morality, see notes 9 & 14 and accompanying text supra; that is, scientific
research into certain areas might assertedly be ethically, philosophically, or spiritually
immoral and therefore susceptible of governmental control.
It is unclear precisely how far a state may go in regulating conduct perceived to be
immoral; a critical threshold distinction may, however, be drawn from the constitu-
tional case law. State action taken to protect the public morality often is upheld in
the absence of a fundamental interest. For instance, expressive activity such as pornog-
raphy is subject to regulation because its value as an "essential part of any exposition
of ideas" and "as a step to truth" is "outweighed by the social interest in order and
morality." Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). Moral objec-
tions to expressive activity cannot, however, justify repression of works having "serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value." Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 34
(1973) (emphasis added). The conclusion is that state action taken in the name of
public morality will not be tolerated when it threatens fundamental liberties respecting
expression-that is, the state may not impose what amounts to ethical, philosophical,
or religious orthodoxies upon the exercise of free expression.
The Court's opinion in Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968), is directly on
point. In Epperson, the Court ruled unconstitutional a state statute imposing criminal
liability on public school teachers who taught Darwin's theory of evolution. The Court
said that the state could not permissibly impose a moral orthodoxy framed in religious
terms without violating constitutional guarantees:
In the present case, there can be no doubt that Arkansas has sought to prevent
its teachers from discussing the theory of evolution because it is contrary to the
belief of some that the Book of Genesis must be the exclusive source of doctrine
as to the origin of man. No suggestion has been made that Arkansas' law may be
justified by considerations of state policy other than the religious views of some of
its citizens. It is clear that fundamentalist sectarian conviction was and is the law's
reason for existence.
.. . Plainly, the law is contrary to the mandate of the First, and in violation
of the Fourteenth, Amendment to the Constitution.
Id. at 107-09 (footnotes omitted).
The state's authority to regulate in the name of public morality has also been cir-
cumscribed when it conflicts with the fundamental right to personal privacy under
the substantive due process protections of the fifth and fourteenth amendments:
"Whatever the power of the state to control public dissemination of ideas inimical to
the public morality, it cannot constitutionally premise legislation on the desirability of
controlling a person's private thoughts." Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 566 (1969).
This article proposes that basic scientific research is an activity protected by the
first amendment. If that is true, these cases make it clear that state action to ban or
control scientific research will not be upheld solely as within the police power to pre-
serve the public morality.
167. Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co. v. State Highway Comm'n, 294 U.S. 613, 622
(1935). See also New York ex rel. Silz v. Hesterberg, 211 U.S. 31 (1908).
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cure the objects of the power. Clearly, then, the police power must
yield to constitutional protection, 168 and cannot be used to suppress
activities simply because the government disapproves of them. 16 9
Experimentation is the information-gathering step in the scientific
process; it may profitably be compared to the news-gathering opera-
tion of the press. The right of journalists to gather news was explicitly
recognized by the Supreme Court in Branzburg v. Hayes:17 0 "[We do
not suggest] that news gathering does not qualify for First Amend-
ment protection; without some protection for seeking out the news,
freedom of the press could be eviscerated .... [R] eporters remain
free to seek news from any source by any means within the law."'1'
168. Police power "necessarily. . .has its limits and must stop when it encoun-
ters the prohibitions of the Constitution." Eubank v. City of Richmond, 226 U.S. 137,
143 (1912).
169. "Legislatures may not, under the guise of the police power, impose restric-
tions that are unnecessary and unreasonable upon ... the pursuit of useful activities."
Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116, 121 (1928).
170. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
171. Id. at 681-82. Branzburg dealt with the so-called "reporter's privilege"--
the right not to divulge confidential sources. The Court held that requiring a reporter
to testify before state or federal grand juries did not abridge first amendment
guarantees. The Court reached that result by applying a balancing test: whatever
intrusion there was on the reporter's first amendment rights was outweighed by the
state's interest in obtaining otherwise unavailable information in a criminal proceed-
ing.
Strictly speaking, Branzburg did not address the right to gather information in the
first instance. The narrow issue presented in Branzburg is unlikely to arise in connec-
tion with research in the physical sciences. In the social sciences, however, as in the
case of the reporter, the problem arguably would arise if a sociologist were com-
pelled to reveal the identity of her subjects. If her subjects are less likely to coop-
erate without a guarantee of anonymity, compelled disclosure of their identities would
constitute an indirect restriction on her freedom to conduct research.
The Supreme Court has never ruled directly on the right of a researcher to pro-
tect his sources. There is lower court dictum supporting the privilege in United
States v. Doe, 460 F.2d 328 (1st Cir. 1972), cert. denied sub nom. Popkin v. United
States, 411 U.S. 909 (1973). In Doe, the court assumed arguendo a researcher's
right to protect sources, but declined to extend the privilege to a researcher's conver-
sation with colleagues. Id. at 333-34.
A more recent lower court ruling in Richards of Rockford, Inc. v. Pacific Gas &
Elec. Co., 71 F.R.D. 388 (N.D. Cal. 1976), is squarely on point. There, in a civil
suit, the court denied an order which would have compelled an economist to divulge
the names of defendant's employees interviewed by the economist in connection with
a research project. The judge in Richards followed a balancing process similar to
that used by the Supreme Court in Branzburg.
For a detailed discussion of the researcher's privilege to protect sources, see
Nejelski & Lerman, A Researcher-Subject Testimonial Privilege: What to Do Before
the Subpoena Arrives, 1971 Wis. L. REv. 1085; Note, The Researcher-Subject Rela-
tionship: The Need for Protection and a Model Statute, 62 GEO. LJ. 243 (1973);
Note, The Public Scholar and the First Amendment: A Compelling Need for Com-
pelling Testimony?, 40 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 995 (1972); Comment, Academic Re-
searchers and the First Amendment: Constitutional Protection for their Confidential
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Branzburg did not limit the right to gather information to the press:
"The informative function asserted by representatives of the orga-
nized press ... is also performed by lecturers, political pollsters, nov-
elists, academic researchers, and dramatists." 172 The implication is
clear: anyone engaged in an informative process has a concomitant
first amendment right to gather grist for his mill.
The right is not absolute, however; it must yield whenever it is
outweighed by a sufficiently important state interest. The companion
cases of Pell v. Procunier"73 and Saxbe v. Washington Post Co. 174 il-
lustrate the types of state interests which outweigh the right to gather
information. In these cases, reporters unsuccessfully challenged regu-
lations prohibiting interviews with prison inmates; 175 the asserted
state interests in both cases consisted of security and related adminis-
trative problems, as well as policy objectives of the correctional sys-
tem itself. Justice Stewart, writing for the majority in both cases,
found no first amendment violation, both because of the primacy of
these state interests and because the regulations did not "deny the
press access to sources of information available to members of the
general public."' 76
Restrictions on the right to gather information have also been
upheld in a number of passport cases. 177 In Zemel v. Rusk, 178 the
Court upheld the Secretary of State's refusal to grant the plaintiff a
passport to Cuba. In the face of plaintiff's asserted interest in learn-
ing about Cuba in order to become a better informed citizen, Chief
Justice Warren observed that "[t] here are few restrictions on action
which could not be clothed by ingenious argument in the garb of de-
creased data flow .... The right to speak and publish does not carry
with it the unrestrained right to gather information."' 79 In Zemel, two
important circumstances underlying the Court's decision help to ex-
plain its result: first, press passports were available to bona fide mem-
Sources?, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 876 (1977); Note, Social Re earch and Privileged
Data, 4 VAL. U.L. REV. 368 (1970).
172. 408 U.S. at 705 (emphasis added).
173. 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
174. 417 U.S. 843 (1974).
175. Pell involved a state rule, and Saxbe a federal rule, prohibiting personal
interviews between reporters and individually named prisoners.
176. Pell, 417 U.S. at 835.
177. E.g., Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964); Kent v. Dulles,
357 U.S. 116(1958).
178. 381 U.S. 1(1965).
179. Id. at 16-17 (emphasis added).
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bers of the news media; second, control of travel to and from foreign
nations involves a special sovereign interest not present elsewhere. 80
Taking these cases together, one may conclude that the first
amendment does in fact protect the gathering of information, but that
the information-gathering process may permissibly be regulated when
such regulation is necessary to further an important state interest. In
Branzburg, the state's interest consisted of obtaining information in
connection with a grand jury investigation. In Pell, Zemel, and Saxbe,
the state's interest lay in regulating the time and place of the informa-
tion-gathering activity so as not to frustrate prison security or foreign
policy objectives. In none of these cases did the government assert an
interest in controlling the content of the reportage.
Scientists rarely, if ever, would assert a right to withhold vital infor-
mation from grand juries or to gain access to information by means
unavailable to the public generally. Scientists would assert only the
right to gather information to test their hypotheses free from govern-
mental restrictions based on the nature of the theory. It seems clear
that the first amendment protects this right. Governmental interfer-
ence with a journalist's right to gather information could not be based
solely on the social or political content of the story he proposed to
write. Restrictions on the scientist's right to experiment should not be
founded on similar considerations.' 8 1
180. The result in Zemel conflicts with the result in an earlier decision, Kent v.
Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958), which has never been overruled and which has been
cited with approval in a number of cases. In Kent, the Court ruled unconstitutional
the Secretary of State's denial of passports because of petitioners' alleged communist
beliefs, on the grounds that denying the passports violated petitioners' right to travel.
However, the holding seemed to be at least partially based on an asserted first amend-
ment interest in gathering information. The Kent Court cited Z. CHAFEE, THREE
HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONSTITUTION OF 1787, at 195 (1965): "Foreign corres-
pondents and lecturers on public affairs need first-hand information. Scientists and
scholars gain greatly from consultations with colleagues in other countries. .. .. [T] rav-
el abroad enables American citizens to understand that people like themselves live
in Europe and helps them to be well-informed on public issues." 357 U.S. at 126-27.
Because Kent has never been overturned, and has been quoted with approval in sev-
eral other cases, Zemel might reasonably be regarded as an aberration.
181. A final variant of this "nexus" argument looks at scientific experimentation
in terms of its relationship to the generation of scientific ideas and knowledge. By
analogy, as communication by conduct is to communication by pure speech, so
generation of ideas by conduct is to generation of ideas by pure thinking and talking.
Expressive conduct decisions hold that conduct-generally susceptible of regulation
under the police power-becomes protected if such conduct is essential for the ex-
pression of certain ideas, and even more highly protected if it appears that the
state's purpose in regulating it is to suppress such ideas. Thus, the rationale of speech-
by-conduct decisions suggests that scientific conduct, such as research, surveys, and
other forms of investigation requiring activity in the world, is entitled to firsi amend-
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Experimentation and fact gathering are critical to the scientific
process in more than the sequential sense; they are also essential to
the integrity of scientific expression. Experimentation is the only way
researchers can test and substantiate their theories. Who would credit
a scientist's assertions that could not be supported by objective evi-
dence? Reputable scientific journals will not publish a researcher's
findings unless they are accompanied by a description of the verifying
experimentation sufficiently detailed to allow others to duplicate the
procedure.18 2 Reporters, on the other hand, particularly investigative
reporters, may write credible stories based on partial information, in-
formed speculation, and information from anonymous sources. Con-
sequently, restrictions on the liberty of scientists to experiment freely
would be more onerous than restrictions on journalists' access to par-
ticular sources of information 183 and should be subject to even more
searching examination than that carried out in Branzburg, Saxbe, and
Pell.
ment protection as an aspect of the amendment's protection of pure thought. It is
idle to posit theories without the liberty to test them and inquire into their validity.
As Justice Brandeis pointed out in the context of social experimentation:
Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught with serious consequences ....
This Court has the power to prevent an experiment . . . .But, in the exercise of
this high power, we must ever be on our guard, lest we erect our prejudices into
legal principles. If we would guide by the light of reason, we must let our minds
be bold.
THE WORDS OF JUSTICE BRANDEIS 76-78 (S. Goldman ed. 1953), cited in Morris,
What is Man?, 19 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 45, 49-50 (1967).
182. "Sufficient information must be included to permit repetition of the experi-
mental work." 169 BIOCHEMICAL J. 2 (1978) (instructions to authors). "[P]apers
which describe only a new technique or method without presenting substantial quan-
tities of data resulting from the use of the new method cannot be accepted for publi-
cation." 153 BIOLOGICAL BULL. at inside front cover (1977).
183. One important element that courts can and do take into account in assessing
free expression cases is the extent to which governmental regulation deprives the
speaker of an alternative forum. For example, in Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Willingboro,
431 U.S. 85 (1977), the Court invalidated a municipal oedinance which banned
"For Sale" and "Sold" signs on real property within the township. The Court ques-
tioned whether the ordinance left open satisfactory "alternative channels for com-
munication":
Although in theory sellers [of real estate] remain free to employ a number of
different alternatives, in practice, realty is not marketed through leaflets, sound-
trucks, demonstrations, or the like. The options to which sellers realistically are
relegated-primarily newspaper advertising and listing with real estate agents-
involve more cost and less autonomy than "For Sale" signs ....
Id. at 95 (citations omitted). See Alfange, Free Speech and Symbolic Conduct: The
Draft-Card Burning Cases, in FREE SPEECH AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 250, 276
(P. Kurland ed. 1975).
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c. Knowing: drawing conclusions
The object of conducting experiments is to prove or disprove a
hypothesis; scientists seek to draw certain conclusions from the results
of their experimentation. In this sense, "knowing" is the purely intel-
lectual operation of the scientist as observer; it is a process closely
akin to mentation, and the first amendment considerations applicable
to mentation 84 apply equally here. As a practical matter, the opera-
tions of the mind are largely beyond the reach of government; at-
tempts to restrain research probably will not come at this point in the
process.
d. The content offirsthand experience
The preceding analysis suggests that powerful support can be found
in existing case law for affording first amendment protection to the
firsthand experience aspect of scientific research: conceiving an idea,
testing the idea, drawing conclusions about the validity of the idea.
This result is firmly grounded in our political traditions as well. Jus-
tice Holmes observed that "if there is any principle of the Constitution
that more imperatively calls for attachment than any other, it is the
principle of free thought-not free thought for those who agree with
us but freedom for thought that we hate."'185 The first amendment is
designed, said Justice Brandeis, to protect "doctrine which a vast ma-
jority of ... citizens believes to be false and fraught with evil conse-
quence."18 6 Protection does not turn on "the truth, popularity, or social
utility of the ideas and beliefs which are offered"; 187 rather, "[a] 11 ideas
having even the slightest redeeming social importance-unorthodox
184. See Part IV-A-1-a supra.
185. United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 654-55 (1929) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
186. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 374 (1927) (concurring opinion in
which Holmes, J., joined). Justice Brandeis continued,
Those who won our independence believed that the final end of the State was to
make men free to develop their faculties .... They recognized the risks to which
all human institutions are subject....
Fear of serious injury cannot alone justify suppression of free speech .... Men
feared witches and burnt women. It is the function of free speech to free men
from the bondage of irrational fears.
Id. at 375-76.
187. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271 (1964) (citing NAACP
v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 445 (1963)).
379
Washington Law Review
ideas, controversial ideas, even ideas hateful to the prevailing climate
of opinion-have the full protection of the [first amendment] guaran-
tees, unless excludable because they encroach upon the limited area of
more important interests." 188 None of these comments was written
with science expressly in mind, 189 yet their declarations of protection
for unpopular ideas clearly ought to be applicable to scientific think-
ing sought to be suppressed because its content is novel or controver-
sial.
The same may be said for the content of the essential firsthand ac-
tivity of science-experimentation. Expressive activities involving
libel,' 90 pornography,' 9 ' fighting words, 192 or incitement to vio-
lence1 93 are subject to regulation because their content is "no essential
part of any exposition of ideas, and [is] of such slight social value as
a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived ...is clearly
outweighed by the social interest in order and morality."' 94 Experi-
mentation, on the other hand, is essential to the exposition of scien-
tific ideas, and is indispensable as a step to scientific truth.
Scientific ideas and experimentation, at least at the stage of basic
research, pose few immediate, tangible, content-related dangers to the
social order. In most cases, harmful impacts will be remote and
conjectural;' 95 if danger appears later, when new scientific knowledge
188. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957).
189. Schvimmer involved the right of a pacifist to become a naturalized citizen;
Whitney involved a state criminal syndicalism act; Sullivan dealt with libel; Roth with
pornography.
190. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
191. See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
192. See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
193. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
194. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (footnote om-
itted) (emphasis added) (citing Z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES
149 (1941)).
A recent expression of the Court's attitude toward content-based regulation of
expression came in a decision dealing with advertising, Virginia State Bd. of Phar-
macy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976). The Court
pointed out that advertising cannot be regulated merely because it is "tasteless or
excessive," id. at 765, but that controls may permissibly be invoked to prevent dis-
semination of "deceptive or misleading" advertising: "Untruthful speech, commercial
or otherwise, has never been protected for its own sake .... The First Amendment
...does not prohibit the State from insuring that the stream of commercial infor-
mation flow cleanly as well as freely." Id. at 771-72 (citations omitted).
195. Obviously, harmful impacts of scientific research are not always remote or
conjectural; an example of inherently hazardous research is that involving recom-
binant DNA, see notes 7 & 8 and accompanying text supra. Such inherently hazardous
scientific activity clearly may be regulated under the police power, see notes 165-69
and accompanying text supra; however, police-power interference with free exercise
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is applied, the state will have the opportunity to intervene in a consti-
tutionally acceptable manner. 196
2. Secondhand experience: learning from others
Free exchange of information is vital to scientific progress because
the scientific method is inherently cumulative or collective in nature.
Researchers absorb the experience of others and use it as the founda-
tion for their own work. In turn, these researchers pass on to others
their own new knowledge through publishing, talks, and seminars.
All these functions involve reciprocal relationships. The right to
teach is a corollary of the right to know; the rights to hear and read
are on the opposite side of the coin from the rights to speak and pub-
lish. Scientists have an interest in both the passive and active aspects
of these activities. As disseminators of new information, they have an
of a fundamental liberty will not be tolerated absent a justifying state interest. The
requisite importance of the asserted state interest will vary with the circumstances; a
useful formula was articulated by Professor Tribe in connection with free expression:
[W] henever it can be demonstrated that the result of the government's rule or
policy is to limit in some significant degree the ease or effectiveness with which a
speaker can reach a specific audience with a particular message, the government
should lose the case unless it can establish that an important public objective
unrelated to the message would be sacrificed by any less restrictive alternative.
L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-20, at 686 (1978) (emphasis added).
See Z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 149-50 (1941) (suggesting
that expression is regulatable to the extent it causes immediate injury to those af-
fected thereby); General Theory, supra note 97, at 921 (same).
196. The authors acknowledge what one observer has called "the new power,
rapidity, and momentum of technological development; the diminishing lead time
between initial innovation and widespread application." L. TRIBE, CHANNELING TECH-
NOLOGY THROUGH LAW 8 (1973). At the same time, government clearly cannot per-
missibly premise regulation of scientific research on a generalized fear that if some-
thing is not done right now, it will be too late. The point at which government may
permissibly intervene will have to be determined with regard to the kinds of con-
siderations discussed at note 195 supra.
The issue is whether government ought to intervene at the point of an idea's
inception and initial development, on the theory that the idea may have harmful
consequences, or wait to intervene until a harmful consequence in fact appears. One
commentator has framed the question using as a model the discovery of fire:
The issue was settled in principle, as I see it, in prehistory, and the outcome
is enshrined in the legend of Prometheus. In its own time and in its own terms, dis-
covering ways of producing fire artificially was as daunting as discovering tech-
niques for producing artificial radioactivity, nuclear power, or synthetic forms of
DNA is today.
As people very soon came to recognize, the proper response was not to outlaw
the very use of fire. Rather it was to invent the legal concept of arson. [That is,]
to develop effective legal sanctions, institutional mechanisms, public sentiments,
and other practical safeguards against the misuse of fire.
S. Toulmin, The Research and the Public Interest, in RESEARCH WITH RECOMBINANT
DNA 101, 105 (1977).
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interest in freedoms of speech and of publication, and in academic
freedom. As recipients, they have an interest in the rights to read, to
hear, and to know. At various times and in various contexts, the Su-
preme Court has declared that all these activities fall within the
bounds of protected expression. 197
a. Dissemination: the right to speak and publish
The constitutional status of speech and the press is too clearly
drawn to require extensive analysis; these rights are, after all, the free-
doms explicitly embraced by the first amendment. Scientific informa-
tion is unlikely to produce the undesirable effects around which the
narrow first amendment exceptions-libel, obscenity, civil disorder,
insurrection 1 9 8-are drawn.1 99
b. Reception: the right to know
The passive right to know-as distinguished from the active right
to seek out information200-has been protected by the Supreme
Court as a necessarily implied reciprocal of the right to speak and to
publish. 201 Bill of Rights protections extend beyond the enumerated
197. E.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
[T] he State may not, consistently with the spirit of the First Amendment, con-
tract the spectrum of available knowledge. The right of freedom of speech and
press includes not only the right to utter or to print, but the right to distribute,
the right to receive, the right to read ... and freedom of inquiry, freedom of
thought, and freedom to teach .... Without those peripheral rights, the specific
rights would be less secure.
Id. at 482 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). For a discussion of Griswold in a
due process setting, see notes 242-43 and accompanying text infra.
198. See cases cited at notes 190-93 supra. In all of these areas, particularly
obscenity and libel, constitutional law has been fluid to say the least. Because the
dissemination of scientific information does not involve any of these narrowly drawn
areas, more extensive discussion of them is omitted.
199. Scientific speech often sounds as though undesirable effects were involved:
it has a foreign quality which tends to be equated with irreligion; it sometimes in-
vokes fears of Andromeda Strains and Frankensteinian inventions in the minds of
the uninitiated. For example, "[tlhe nonmathematician is seized by a mysterious
shuddering when he hears of 'four-dimensional' things, by a feeling not unlike that
awakened by thoughts of the occult." L. BARNETT, supra note 115, at 61. This pecu-
liar quality of scientific speech, coupled with the growing reliance of science on
government funding, see note 272 infra, could make scientific expression more sus-
ceptible to governmental regulation than other forms of expression.
200. The right to know as an active search for new knowledge is discussed in
Part IV-A-1-b supra.




guarantees to include "those equally fundamental personal rights nec-
essary to make the express guarantees ... meaningful."202 In the case
of expression, this extension is justified because "[t] he dissemination
of ideas can accomplish nothing if otherwise willing addressees are
not free to receive and consider them. It would be a barren market-
place of ideas that had only sellers and no buyers. '203
This right to know has received protection in a wide variety of con-
texts, including academic freedom, 204 criticism of public officials,2 05
broadcasting, 206 advertising,2 07 and religious pamphleteering. 208 One
leading commentator has suggested that this right to read, listen, and
see should be protected absolutely, because "any danger to the social
order at this point [of receipt of information] is so inchoate and so
unascertainable that it cannot be given substance or taken into ac-
count. °209 A scientist, simply by virtue of being a scientist, poses no
[T] he Supreme Court has flatly rejected governmental measures whose justifica-
tion "rests... on the advantages of [people] being kept in ignorance." The choice
"between the dangers of suppressing information, and the dangers of its misuse if
freely available," the Court has said, is one "that the first amendment makes
for us."
L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 15-7, at 904-05 & n.18 (1978) (foot-
notes omitted) (quoting Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Con-
sumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 769, 770 (1976)).
202. Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 308 (1965) (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
203. Id.
204. "When academic teaching-freedom and its corollary learning-freedom, so
essential to the well-being of the Nation, are claimed, this Court will always be on
the alert against intrusion .. . into this constitutionally protected domain." Baren-
blatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 112 (1959) (congressional investigation of
communist activities on college campuses). See note 220 infra.
205. "[D]ebate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open,
... it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks
on government and public officials." New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254, 270 (1964).
206. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). "It is the purpose
of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which
truth will ultimately prevail . . . . It is the right of the public to receive suitable
access to social, political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences which is
crucial here." Id. at 390. This decision upheld the FCC's "fairness doctrine," re-
quiring broadcast licensees to give equal "air" time to representatives for various
sides of public issues under certain circumstances.
207. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976). "[T]he particular consumer's interest in the free flow of
commercial information . . . may be as keen, if not keener by far, than his interest
in the day's most urgent political debate .... Generalizing, society also may have a
strong interest in the free flow of commercial information." Id. at 763-64 (footnote
omitted).
208. Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943). The Court invalidated
an ordinance banning door-to-door distribution of leaflets as impermissibly restrict-
ing the "dissemination of knowledge." Id. at 143.
209. Emerson, Legal Foundations of the Right to Know, 1976 WASH. U.L.Q. 1, 6;
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more threat to the social order in the receipt of information than does
a nonscientist. His right to receive information should therefore be as
thoroughly protected as that enjoyed by anyone else.
Courts have protected the right to know not only because of its log-
ical nexus with the active rights mentioned above, but also to promote
valued policy objectives: expanding knowledge, discovering truth,
and informing the body politic. 210 Because of the "historic func-
tion [s]" served by this right, "freedom of discussion .. .must em-
brace all issues about which information is needed or appropriate to
enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies of their pe-
riod."21'
These concerns argue for unimpeded flow of scientific information
at least as much as they do for free flow of other forms of
information. Furthermore, providing the citizenry with data that will
enable them to make political decisions more wisely is not the only
consideration. There is also the danger that depriving the cumulative
scientific process of complete information will result in decisions that
are positively harmful. Aerosol propellants are in widespread use to-
day because of incomplete information about the effects of fluorocar-
bons on the earth's ozone layer. The hazards of incompleteness thus
argue for extending to scientific information the widest possible scope
of constitutional protection.
Once the right to know is established, it follows immediately that
constitutional protection must be afforded the means by which we re-
ceive knowledge-hearing and reading.212 "[T] he First Amendment
protects the right to receive information and ideas, the freedom to
hear as well as the freedom to speak .... [These rights] are insepar-
able; they are two sides of the same coin."2 1 3 These notions apply
equally to reading, which is to print as hearing is to speech.
see General Theory, supra note 97, at 919 (immediacy of impact as test for dif-
ferentiating between "speech" and "action").
210. See Part 111-A supra.
211. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940).
212. "The [first amendment] protection afforded is to the communication, to its
source and to its recipients both." Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Cit-
izens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 756 (1976) (right to advertise neces-
sarily involves reciprocal right to receive advertising). See also Thomas v. Collins,
323 U.S. 516, 534 (1954) (workers' right to hear union organizer); Kovacs v.
Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (dealing in part with right to hear or not to hear mes-
sages broadcast by sound trucks).
213. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 775 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
In this case, the right to hear was asserted unsuccessfully in connection with the
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The right to receive information and ideas has been held to exist
without regard to content or the perceived social worth of the message
conveyed. 214 In the case of obscenity, which the Court has held to fall
outside the ambit of first amendment protection, 215 the Court has
been careful to point out that obscene material "by definition lacks
any serious literary, artistic, or scientific value."216 Control of
obscenity has been carefully differentiated from "control of reason
and intellect." 217 It seems clear, then, that so long as material does
have serious scientific value, objections to its content based on moral
or political preferences would be held insufficient to justify govern-
mental interference with either the receipt or the dissemination of
such information.
In practice, governmental interference with the scientific process is
least likely to occur at the dissemination of reception stages. Suppres-
sion of pure expression in either its active or passive aspect cannot
easily be disguised as anything but what it is: censorship. 21 8 Govern-
mental suppression of information with scientific content would be
difficult to justify to a citizenry with its roots in the Enlightenment. 21 9
denial of a visa for a foreign communist invited to speak in the United States. The
Court's decision upholding the denial turned on the traditional "plenary" power of
Congress to exclude aliens. See discussion of Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965), and
Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958), at notes 178-80 and accompanying text supra.
214. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969).
215. See, e.g., Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 61 (1973); Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957). The power to control obscenity is based,
said the Court, on "a State's broad power to regulate commerce and protect the
public environment." Paris Adult Theatre, 413 U.S. at 68-69.
216. Paris Adult Theatre, 413 U.S. 49, 67 (1973) (quoting language from Miller
v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24, 34 (1973) (emphasis added)).
217. Paris Adult Theatre, 413 U.S. 49, 67 (1973).
218. Suppression at the experimentation stage, on the other hand, could rela-
tively easily be cloaked in improper assertion of the police power, see notes 165-69
and accompanying text supra, or in the rhetoric of cost-benefit analysis for legisla-
tive or administrative funding decisions, see notes 237 & 272 and accompanying
text infra.
219. An exception to this statement might arise when access to scientific informa-
tion is restricted for reasons of national security; however, the government has yet
to assert national security successfully as justification for prior restraint on expres-
sion. As Professor Tribe observed, "The Supreme Court has spoken of constitutionally
permissible prior restraints as 'exceptional cases' [quoting dictum in Near v. Minne-
sota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931)]. This impression has been reinforced by the Court's
decisions refusing to perceive [alleged] threats to national security [citing New York
Times v. United States (The Pentagon Papers Case), 403 U.S. 713 (1971)] ....
L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-33, at 728-29 & nn.1-2 (1978).
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3. The scientist as informational conduit: the right to teach
To this point, we have been concerned with the right of scientists to
express themselves in a general way, speaking in the marketplace of
ideas like other citizens. Another important element of the scientific
process is organized dissemination; that is, formal teaching in the
classroom and laboratory.2 20
The Court on a single occasion had the opportunity to rule on a
teacher's first amendment right to teach unpopular scientific the-
ory-Darwin's theory of evolution-but declined to do so, deciding
the case instead on establishment of religion grounds. 221 Earlier, how-
ever, in Meyer v. Nebraska,2 22 the Court found that a state statute
forbidding the teaching of German violated the due process clause be-
cause it attempted "to interfere with the calling of modem language
teachers, with the opportunities of pupils to acquire knowledge, and
with the power of parents to control the education of their own [chil-
dren] ."223 The state's power over the content of curriculum, while
substantial, could not be exercised unreasonably so as to deprive
220. The Court generally has extolled the virtues of academic freedom and
erected demanding standards for testing the validity of governmental encroachment.
For example, the Court in Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957) (plu-
rality), said that governmental action must be "carefully circumscribed when [it)
tends to impinge upon such highly sensitive areas as freedom of speech or press
. . . and freedom of communication of ideas, particularly in the academic com-
munity." Id. at 245. "Teachers and students always remain free to inquire, to study
and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and understanding; otherwise our civilization
will stagnate and die." Id. at 250. The principles which govern the classroom ought
to apply equally to physical and social science laboratories. See Barenblatt v. United
States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959). See also Murphy, Academic Freedom-An Emerging
Constitutional Right, 28 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 447 (1963) (discussing Barenblatt).
Murphy concludes that, as of 1959, "all nine Justices of the Supreme Court had ex-
pressly recognized academic freedom as being within the area of constitutional pro-
tection." Id. at 457.
In a case decided a year after Barenblatt, the Court clarified what it meant by
"academic freedom":
By limiting the power of the States to interfere with freedom of speech and
freedom of inquiry . . . , the Fourteenth Amendment protects all persons,
no matter what their calling. . . . [I] n view of the nature of the teacher's
relation to the effective exercise of the rights which are safeguarded by the Bill
of Rights and by the Fourteenth Amendment, inhibition of thought, and of ac-
tion upon thought, in the case of teachers brings the safeguards of those amend-
ments vividly into operation.
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960) (quoting Wieman v. Updegraff, 344
U.S. 183, 195 (1952) (concurring opinion of Frankfurter and Douglas, JJ.)) (em-
phasis added).
221. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968).




learners of knowledge not clearly harmful.22 4 The decision was
premised not on the first amendment, which at the time had not yet
been held to apply to state legislatures, but rather on substantive due
process grounds. Today, the decision in Meyer would more likely be
based on first amendment principles because of the increased willing-
ness of courts to rely on first amendment doctrine directly to accom-
plish results formerly achieved under different theories. 225 For exam-
ple, Meyer's due process holding was recently recast in first
amendment terms in a right-to-contraception case: "[T] he state may
not, consistently with the spirit of the First Amendment, contract the
spectrum of available knowledge.... And so we reaffirm the princi-
ple of [Meyer] .... "226
More recent opinions have also tended to strengthen the rights of
teachers to speak and teach without excessive or unreasonable restric-
tions. In Sweezy v. New Hampshire,227 the Supreme Court considered
a case involving a contempt citation issued a state university teacher
in part because he refused to answer questions asked by the state legis-
lature about a lecture he had given on socialism. In reversing the
teacher's conviction, the Supreme Court emphasized the importance
of academic freedom:
The essentiality of freedom in the community of American universi-
ties is almost self-evident .... Scholarship cannot flourish in an atmo-
sphere of suspicion and distrust. Teachers and students must always
remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity
and understanding; otherwise our civilization will stagnate and die.228
Although Sweezy involved political rather than scientific speech,
and after-the-fact criminal penalties rather than prospective state reg-
ulation, the underlying principles are stated broadly enough to leave
little doubt they would be held applicable to limitations placed on the
freedom of scientific inquiry of teachers. A concurring opinion of Jus-
tice Frankfurter in the same case makes this evident. Applying a bal-
ancing test, and expressly mentioning science, he gives overriding
224. Id. at 402.
225. See SYSTEM, supra note 26, at 600.
226. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965) (Douglas, J.) (empha-
sis added).
227. 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
228. Id. at 250.
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weight to the harm that would result to the university if the penalty
were upheld:
Progress in the natural sciences is not remotely confined to findings
made in the laboratory. Insights into the mysteries of nature are born
of hypothesis and speculation .... For society's good-if understand-
ing be an essential need of society-inquiries into these problems,
speculations about them, stimulation in others of reflection upon
them, must be left as unfettered as possible. Political power must ab-
stain from intrusion into this activity of freedom . . . except for rea-
sons that are exigent and obviously compelling.229
Later cases involving loyalty oaths demanded of public school teach-
ers,230 teaching materials,231 criticism by teachers of school adminis-
trators,23 2 and the wearing of symbolic armbands by students233
provide additional support for the proposition that scientific speech
uttered in a teaching context ought to receive first amendment pro-
tection.234
4. Framing the challenge: direct and indirect interference
Governmental interference would be most vulnerable to constitu-
tional challenge were it to be direct-that is, in the form of an
229. Id. at 261-62.
230. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
231. Parducci v. Rutland, 316 F. Supp. 352 (M.D. Ala. 1970). See Keefe v.
Geanakos, 418 F.2d 359 (1st Cir. 1969).
232. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
233. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
234. See SYSTEM, supra note 26, at 613, which argues that any system of free
expression depends on the existence of an educated, independent citizenry trained in
handling ideas, judging arguments and facts, thinking independently, and participating
in the marketplace of ideas, and that the satisfaction of these needs requires
academic freedom. That the Court has refused to extend to education the status of
a fundamental interest for equal protection purposes does not necessarily affect this
conclusion. In San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973),
the Court expressly held that
education . . . is not among the rights afforded explicit protection under our
Federal Constitution. Nor do we find any basis for saying it is implicitly so pro-
tected. As we have said, the undisputed importance of education will not alone
cause this Court to depart from the usual [rational relationship to legitimate
state purpose] standard for reviewing a State's social and economic legislation.
Id. at 35 (emphasis added). The language in Rodriguez leaves room for protection
of scientific education for two reasons. First, it is not the importance of education
alone that is being asserted here, but also the critical nexus between the scientific
process and the rights to teach and to learn. Second, restriction of scientific inquiry




outright ban on certain kinds of research on the basis of its content. It
is axiomatic that what government cannot do directly, it ought not be
permitted to do indirectly. The most obvious method of indirect regu-
lation of scientific research would be denial of funding by government
agencies.23 5 There is little question that the Supreme Court could find
indirect regulation in such a denial: "It is too late in the day to doubt
that the liberties of religion and expression may be infringed by the
denial of or placing of conditions upon a benefit or privilege."2 36
In the case of the scientist, unfettered pursuit of scientific knowl-
edge is the asserted fundamental right, while governmental research
funding is the asserted benefit. A constitutional challenge should lie if
the scientist has been either denied funding or compelled to forego re-
search in certain areas as a condition of receiving funding, and if he
can demonstrate that the funding decision was based on impermissible
considerations of the content of his proposed research. 237 The scien-
235. Public monies disbursed by various government agencies are by far the
largest source of funding for scientific research. See note 272 infra. It is arguable
that government enjoys what amounts to a monopoly of the science funding field;
at the least, government's dominance of the field gives it potentially powerful con-
trol over what is and what is not undertaken by scientific investigators.
236. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963) (footnote omitted). In Sher-
bert, the Court ruled that a state could not deprive petitioner of unemployment bene-
fits for failure to meet qualification requirements, when that failure resulted from
religious convictions respecting the day of rest. See id. n.6 (listing "examples of
conditions and qualifications upon governmental privileges and benefits which have
been invalidated because of their tendency to inhibit constitutionally protected ac-
tivity"). Other examples include Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958), in which
the Court struck down a condition limiting the availability of a tax exemption to
those members of the exempted class who affirmed their loyalty to the state govern-
ment granting the exemption, and Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589
(1967), in which the Court ruled that teachers at a state university could not be
deprived of their employment for refusal to comply with regulations requiring dis-
closure of their association with the Communist Party.
237. Legislatures obviously must apply some kind of cost-benefit analysis when
they evaluate spending requests; such cost-benefit analyses in connection with re-
quests for research grants will necessarily involve consideration of the content of
the research proposed. When evaluation of content is restricted to a rational weigh-
ing of the benefits likely to be derived from a given research project, courts should
defer to legislative judgment regarding funding. If, however, evaluation of content
includes consideration either directly or indirectly of moral, ethical, or philosophical
values, then first amendment questions arise and courts should require a showing of
a compelling state interest. See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §
12-8, at 602-05 (1978). Courts should be sure that an asserted permissible basis for
denial of funding does not veil an impermissible basis:
In first amendment cases, the Supreme Court is least likely to take into account
governmental interests which, though conceivable . . . were not actually con-
sidered by the relevant decision maker. The Court also requires an especially
close nexus between ends and means. A statute must be narrowly drawn so that
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tist should prevail unless the government can prove that the decision
to deny or condition funding was made to further a compelling state
interest.238
The foregoing discussion assumes that scientific research may be
analytically parsed into discrete functions. In actuality, however, the
various components are not discrete, but rather are inextricably
bound with one another in a complex, dynamic process in which each
part is dependent on the others and the whole dependent on the
proper operation of each part.239 A sizable measure of first amend-
ment protection cloaks each element in the process; logic compels the
conclusion that the entire process must therefore be protected.
5. Applying the proper standard
Although the Court has never declared unequivocally what consti-
tutional standard is appropriate in first amendment cases, it is agreed
that "freedom of expression is a liberty that comes to the Court 'with a
momentum for respect.' . . . [A] 11 modern Justices have agreed that
the First Amendment is 'special' in some senses; the disputes have
been over the implementation of that 'specialness.' "240
Because the scientific process includes many elements, some of
which are and some of which are not pure speech, perhaps the follow-
ing formulation will be the most helpful in setting forth the proper
test:
a challenged act of government is clearly an efficacious means to achieve per-
tnissible objectives of government and is narrowly aimed at those permissible
objectives so as not unnecessarily to reach expressive conduct protected by the
first amendment.
Id. at 602 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). See cases cited id. nn. I & 2.
238. Generally speaking, governmental actions carry a presumption of validity,
and anyone challenging a statute, regulation, or governmental practice has the burden
of proving that the state has acted irrationally. If, however, the challenger alleges
state infringement upon a fundamental liberty or interest, the burden shifts: the
government must demonstrate at least a legitimate, and perhaps a compelling, state
interest, and usually must show that it has chosen the least restrictive means available
to accomplish its legitimate objective. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 133, 155
(1973); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969); Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. 398, 406 (1963). See generally Note, The Right to Decide-Individual Liberty
Versus State Police Powers, 18 ARIZ. L. REV. 207, 224-25 (1976).
239. On the synergy of scientific discovery, see notes 228-29 and accompanying
text supra. See generally W. BEVERIDGE, supra note 114.
240. G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1053 (9th
ed. 1975) (quoting Frankfurter, J., concurring in Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77,
95 (1949)).
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This Court has held that when "speech" and "nonspeech" elements
are combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important
governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify
incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms. To characterize
the quality of the governmental interest which must appear, the Court
has employed a variety of descriptive terms: compelling; substantial;
subordinating; paramount; cogent; strong. Whatever imprecision in-
heres in these terms, we think it clear that a governmental regulation
is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the
Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental
interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of
free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First
Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance
of that interest. 241
It seems likely that any suppression, either direct or indirect, of re-
search on the basis of its content alone would be impermissible under
this standard.242 As has been pointed out, there is no constitutional
241. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1969) (footnotes omitted).
242. See Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 210 (1975); Police
Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972). The government may, of course, dissimu-
late, concealing a discriminatory purpose under an ostensibly neutral objective. Judi-
cial history shows, however, that courts will pierce an announced objective if a
discriminatory purpose is obvious. Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20
(1922); see Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S_496, 515-16 (1939); Developments in the Law-
Academic Freedom, 81 HARv. L. REV. 1045, 1054-55 (1968). At times the courts
will do this without declaring their mistrust of the legislative motive, but rather will
strike down the law for overbreadth, under a balancing-of-interests analysis, or be-
cause of the "necessary effect" of the statute-thus achieving their purpose without
inviting a confrontation with the legisature or inviting the charge that they are en-
gaging in judicial psychoanalysis. E.g., SYSTEM, supra note 26, at 280-81.
Alternatively, the government might concede that its concern in curbing research
in such sensitive areas as those mentioned in Part I is to suppress knowledge that
might be disquieting or disillusioning, but deny that this constitutes an attack on
inquiry based on content. Rather, the government could argue, the need to repress
such research stems from the likelihood that, if carried out, it would result in deleterious
changes in human values and self-concepts, see generally Tribe, supra note 121, and
that changes in values always imply changes in behavior. Thus, an objection which
appears to be based on content can be rephrased as one based on physical conse-
quences. There appear to be a number of answers to this approach:
(1) Changes in society's structure which take place through the mediating
power of speech are expressly protected by the first amendment, even though
the government might disapprove of the changes. See GENERAL THEORY, supra
note 97, at 924 (such concerns not legitimate state interests).
(2) The argument "proves too much." Since all ideas have consequences, up-
holding governmental regulation of scientific ideas because of the possibility of
remote consequences invites the state to become the regulator of all speech
that could cause social change-a result clearly at odds with one of the cen-
tral purposes of the first amendment.
(3) Even if resisting certain changes in social attitudes and beliefs is a legiti-
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power to interfere with a given course of conduct simply because it
may produce information which is unpopular, unsettling, or politi-
cally inexpedient. The government has no proper interest in interfer-
ing with such conduct, and such interference would certainly be "re-
lated to the suppression of free expression."
B. Other Constitutional Rationales
The foregoing discussion suggests that in the first amendment, the
scientist finds the necessary legal tools to ward off impermissible
governmental encroachment. Depending on the manner in which the
infringement occurs, other constitutional theories may also be avail-
able.
1. Due process2 43
a. Substantive due process
When, in the early part of this century, the Supreme Court forged a
shield for individual rights from the due process clauses of the fifth
and fourteenth amendments, it "pour [ed] into the due process clause
mate concern of the state, banning fundamental research will generally not be
essential to the accomplishment of this objective (although it will, of course,
be sufficient). Usually there will be a time interval between the commence-
ment of such research and the appearance of the undesired effect, during which
the state may institute countermeasures designed to minimize the impact of the
new findings or ideas, including, for example, funding or encouraging research
aimed at challenging the questioned research or developing alternative interpre-
tations of the data, thereby bringing about a more balanced view.
243. Constitutional due process analysis revolves around specific language in the
fifth and fourteenth amendments: "No person shall be ...deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law ...... U.S. CoNsT. amend. V. "No State
shall . . .deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law .... ." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Supreme Court has developed two
major lines of due process analysis: substantive due process, see Part IV-B--I-a
infra, and procedural due process, see Part IV-B-1-b infra.
Broadly speaking, substantive due process addresses the substantive content of
the words "life, liberty, or property" in the two amendments. This line of due process
analysis first emerged in connection with state regulation of economic activity. See,
e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (freedom of contract held to be
within the liberties protected by the fourteenth amendment). The Court has since
retreated from its due process activism in the economic sphere and become quite
deferential to legislative regulation. See, e.g., Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502
(1934) (dairy price controls upheld as not arbitrary, discriminatory, or irrelevant to
a legitimate legislative objective). In the 1920's, substantive due process was applied
to personal rights: that is, the Court read into the word "liberty" certain "fundamen-
tal rights"-such as freedom of association and rights involving privacy and personal
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fundamental values not readily traceable to constitutional text or his-
tory or structure. '2 44 One such fundamental value was freedom to
gain useful knowledge:
Without doubt, [the "liberty" protected by the fourteenth amend-
ment] denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the
right of the individual to... engage in any of the common occupations
of life, to acquire useful knowledge ... and generally to enjoy those
privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly
pursuit of happiness by free men.245
This comment on the breadth of substantive due process was made
in Meyer v. Nebraska,246 in which the Court found a state statute pro-
hibiting the teaching of a foreign language to young children to inter-
fere unjustifiably with the interest of the teachers in following their
calling, as well as the rights of the pupils to acquire knowledge.247
autonomy-to go along with the express constitutional guarantees of freedom of
speech, press, and religion. When governmental action threatens one of these funda-
mental interests, the Court will apply a more strict standard of review than the
relatively deferential reasonable relation-minimum rationality test reserved for other
legislative decisions. As Justice Harlan explained,
[w]ere due process merely a procedural safeguard it would fail to reach those
situations where the deprivation of life, liberty or property was accomplished
by legislation which by operating in the future could, given even the fairest
possible procedure in application to individuals, nevertheless destroy the en-
joyment of all three.
Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 541 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). See generally G.
GUNTHER, supra note 240, at 616 passim; L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW§§ 15-1 to -21 (1978).
In contrast with the concern of substantive due process for the content of legis-
lative action, procedural due process
delineates the constitutional limits on the judicial, executive, and administrative
enforcement of [legislative action]. This has traditionally involved the elabora-
tion of procedural safeguards designed to accord to the individual "the right to
be heard before being condemned to suffer grievous loss of any kind" [Joint
Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951) (Frankfur-
ter, J., concurring)] as a result of governmental choices-which can take the
form of acts or, less commonly, of omissions. The extent to which one may re-
quire officials to submit to judicial or quasi-judicial review of conduct which
disadvantages the individual depends upon the range of personal interests quali-
fying as protected "life," "liberty," and "property," and upon the sort of hearing
which threats to such interests trigger.
L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 10-7, at 502 (1978) (emphasis in
original) (footnotes omitted). See G. GUNTHER, supra at 486 passim.
244. G. GUNTHER, supra note 240, at 616.
245. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (emphasis added). "[T]he
word 'liberty' contained in the [fourteenth] amendment embraces ... the right of a
person ... to be free in the enjoyment of all his faculties .... " Grosjean v. Amer-
ican Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 244 (1936) (voiding a state tax on certain publications
as an unconstitutional "tax on knowledge").
246. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
247. Id. at 401. The Court also cited the parents' right to control the education of
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The Court characterized the statute as "an infringement of rights long
freely enjoyed." 248 There is no reason to suppose that the Meyer
Court's assertion of rights on behalf of teachers and students with re-
spect to foreign language should apply with any less force to science.
Two years later, the Court arrived at a similar conclusion in Pierce
v. Society of Sisters,249 sustaining a challenge by parochial and pri-
vate schools to a state law requiring children to attend public school.
The Court held that the law interfered with "the liberty of parents and
guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under
their control" 250 and rejected the assertion of "any general power of
the State to standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruc-
tion from public teachers only. '251
Pierce and Meyer were cited with approval thirty years later in
Griswold v. Connecticut,252 but the fundamental freedoms involved
in those cases were declared in Griswold to be protected primarily by
the first rather than the fourteenth amendment:
[T] he State may not, consistently with the First Amendment, contract
the spectrum of available knowledge. The right of freedom of speech
and press includes not only the right to utter or to print, but ... the
right to receive, the right to read [and] freedom of inquiry, freedom
of thought, and freedom to teach .... 253
Another important substantive due process right, a right to privacy,
has been recognized only recently. In Stanley v. Georgia,254 the Court
overturned a state law making private possession of allegedly obscene
material a crime. The decision turned on the first amendment right to
receive information as well as the due process privacy right to be left
alone:
[A] lso fundamental is the right to be free, except in very limited cir-
cumstances, from unwanted governmental intrusions into one's pri-
vacy. "The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions
their own children. See notes 222-26 supra for a discussion of Meyer in a first amend-
ment setting.
248. 262 U.S. at 403.
249. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
250. Id. at 534-35.
251. Id. The Court also found unreasonable interference with the business and
property interests of the private schools. Id. at 535-36.
252. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
253. Id. at 482 (citations omitted).
254. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
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favorable to the pursuit of happiness. . .. They sought to protect
Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their
sensations."2 55
The individual, said the Court, may constitutionally "satisfy his intel-
lectual . . needs in the privacy of his own home"; 256 he has a right
"to read or observe what he pleases. '257
Griswold and Stanley have been cited by lower courts to support
the conclusion that an individual's mental processes are protected by
due process rights of privacy as well as by the first amendment.258 In
Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental Health,259 the court said that
" [t] here is no privacy more deserving of constitutional protection
than that of one's mind. '2 60 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has
also recognized a privacy-based right to control one's own mental
processes. Citing a line of privacy cases including Stanley, the court
held that a prisoner had stated a proper cause of action in a complaint
alleging violation of his civil rights when the staff at the state medical
facility subjected him to behavior modification by aversive condition-
ing.261
Taken together, these cases suggest that both the scientist and the
public could assert a substantive due process right to pursue scientific
inquiry, both as a matter of acquiring useful knowledge and as a mat-
ter of mentational privacy. The scientist ought to be left alone to gen-
erate and communicate ideas, and to "observe what he pleases." 262
b. Procedural due process
In general, governmental action which deprives any person of his
liberty or property without the benefit of a hearing is a violation of
procedural due process.263 In the preceding section, the conclusion
255. Id. at 564 (quoting Brandeis, J., dissenting in Olmstead v. United States, 277
U.S. 438, 478 (1928)).
256. 394 U.S. at 565.
257. Id. at 568.
258. See discussion of mentation and the first amendment in Part IV-A-i-a supra.
259. Civil No. 73-19434-AW (Cir. Ct. Wayne County, Mich., July 10, 1973),
reprinted in I ABA MENTAL DISABILrrY L. REP. 147 (1976). See note 162 supra.
260. 1 ABA MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP. at 153. See Shapiro, supra note 161,
at 258.
261. Mackey v. Procunier, 477 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1973).
262. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568 (1969).
263. See note 243 supra.
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was reached that the freedom to acquire useful knowledge is not only
protected by the first amendment, but is also within the meaning of
"liberty" as set forth in the due process clauses of the fifth and four-
teenth amendments. Thus, any governmental action which has the ef-
fect of denying or impairing the constitutionally guaranteed freedom
of inquiry enjoyed by scientists must be preceded by notice and an ap-
propriate opportunity to be heard.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has recently acknowledged that
citizens may acquire a property interest-a "legitimate claim of enti-
tlement"-in certain kinds of government largesse. 264 In terms of
procedural due process, the issue is whether such an entitlement may
be taken away without a proper evidentiary hearing. The Court has
held that such a hearing must be provided before wages can be gar-
nished,2 65 welfare benefits terminated, 266 driver's licenses revoked, 267
consumer goods repossessed, 26 8 parole revoked,2 69 or a tenured col-
lege professor fired by a public educational institution.27 0
In the case of scientific research, entitlements might be asserted in
connection with faculty hiring and tenure in public institutions of
higher learning,2 7 1 and in connection with governmental decisions to
264. The Supreme Court has stated, "To have a property interest in a benefit, a
person . . . must . . . have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it. It is a purpose of
the ancient institution of property to protect those claims upon which people rely in
their daily lives, reliance that must not be arbitrarily undermined." Board of Regents
v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). In order to assert a property right in a benefit,
"a person clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire for it.... He must,
instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it." Id.
Professor Charles Reich, who wrote the seminal article on the notion of entitle-
ments, see Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964), has written that
"[siociety today is built around entitlement [and ml any of the most important of
these entitlements now flow from the government . . . . Such sources of security...
are no longer regarded as luxuries or gratuities; to the recipients they are essentials,
fully deserved .... ." Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging
Legal Issues, 74 YALE L.J. 1254, 1255 (1965), quoted in Arnett v. Kennedy, 416
U.S. 134, 208 n.2 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
265. Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
266. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
267. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (197 1).
268. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
269. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
270. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408
U.S. 564 (1972). See also Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952) (college
professors and staff members dismissed during the terms of their employment con-
tracts have an interest in continued employment).
271. See text accompanying notes 17-18 supra (teacher either fired or denied ten-
ure due to content of his research as presenting possible first amendment issues of
scientific liberty). See also Developments in the Law-Academic Freedom, 81 HARV.
L. REV. 1045, 1081 (1968); cases cited at note 270 supra.
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condition, deny, or withdraw funding with respect to a given area of
scientific inquiry.272
272. Apart from private industry, which is primarily oriented toward technology
and therefore is outside our discussion, the bulk of scientific research is dependent on
public monies. See, e.g., David, Toward a National Science Policy, 61 AMER. Scd. 20
(1973); Symington, Science in a Political Context: One View by a Politician, 194
SCIENCE 402 (1976). There is little doubt that "[i]n the post-World War II period,
the Federal Government has become the dominant source of support for basic re-
search." NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION, 26TH ANNUAL REPORT FOR FISCAL YEAR
1976, at xi (1976) (statement of acting NSF director Richard C. Atkinson).
In 1974, the latest year for which complete statistical data are available, the total
estimated expenditure for basic research in the United States was $4 billion. Of that
amount, 68% was supplied by the federal government, 15% by private industry, I 1%
by colleges and universities (including state and local taxes), and 6% by nonprofit
institutions. While colleges and universities supplied only 11% of the total, they
spent 54% of the total; at these institutions of higher learning, where the case for
freedom of inquiry is presumably strongest, the federal government supplied more
than 70% of the funds spent on basic research. There are no figures showing how
much of the remainder was supplied by state and local taxes, which also would be
subject to state regulation and give rise to entitlement claims. See NAT'L SCIENCE
BOARD, NAT'L SCIENCE FOUNDATION, SCIENCE INDICATORS 1974, at 50, 185--87, 193
(1974). See also SYSTEM, supra note 26, at 596, 624-26 (mentioning potential im-
pact of federal grant-giving policy on academic freedom).
The federal government's financial commitment to the funding of basic science
continues to grow, according to a recent report on the proposed budget of the Na-
tional Science Foundation for fiscal 1979: "Basic research, which constitutes 91 per
cent of NSF's budget, totals about $755 million, a 9.7 increase over 1978.
SCIENCE NEws, Jan. 28, 1978, at 53.
The argument based on federal funding can also be made in first amendment
terms. Emerson and others have called attention to the potential impact on the
marketplace of ideas of large-scale governmental entry into this area, either through
the funding of particular "speakers," or through action taken on its own behalf.
See, e.g., SYSTEM, supra note 26, at 627-75 (Chapter 17, "Affirmative Promotion of
Freedom of Expression"), 697-716 (Chapter 19, "Government Participation in the
System of Free Expression"). Emerson suggests that entry by the government into
the marketplace of ideas is legitimate-the government is as entitled to speak as
anyone-but that its entry can result in the marketplace becoming less free. Id. and
cases cited therein. Thus, large-scale entry by the state, through funding or other-
wise, into areas of expression should be accompanied by protections such as re-
quirements of fairness and support of diverse points of view. See notes 279-97 and
accompanying text infra (equal protection analysis).
Whether the argument is made in due process or first amendment terms, a key
issue would appear to be the extent to which the government exercises a funding
monopoly, such that an investigator in a particular area can only obtain funds from
the government. To the extent this is true, the marketplace-of-ideas model is no longer
serviceable. Presumably, prior to development of such a monopoly, a scientist denied
government money could take her research proposal elsewhere and, if it were found
meritorious, expect to find support-for example, funding from a private founda-
tion. The "marketplace" would still remain effective, because an idea unpopular to
the government might be subsidized elsewhere. Arguably, the heavy governmental
incursion into the area of scientific research has reversed this situation, however,
with the result that ideas and proposals of which the government disapproves stand
little chance of being developed. To the extent this is so, there is a danger that
investigations of which governmental grant-givers disapprove will never be carried
out. The effect is thus the same as if the ideas were directly prohibited. This argu-
ment, of course, rests on the assumption that government should not be permitted to
do indirectly what it cannot do directly.
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Procedural due process is a relatively weak weapon in the scien-
tist's protective arsenal because it affords, at most, a right to a hear-
ing. Thus, governmental action could survive challenge upon a show-
ing that its decisionmaking procedure comported with the due process
requirement that "there shall be notice and opportunity for hearing
given the parties." 273 Furthermore, governmental action which "ap-
plies to more than a few people" is immune to a procedural due pro-
cess challenge on the grounds that there was no notice or opportunity
to be heard.274 Consequently, an individual scientist would be unable
to mount a procedural due process challenge to governmental action
applicable to scientists generally.
A final due process argument involves a series of cases invalidating
government action on procedural due process grounds because of so-
called "irrebuttable presumptions." Perhaps the best example of the
irrebuttable presumption analysis is Cleveland Board of Education v.
LaFleur,27 5 in which the Court overturned a school board's manda-
tory maternity leave rules requiring pregnant teachers to leave their
jobs without pay several months before the expected date of birth.
The Court found that the rules raised a conclusive presumption that
teachers were physically incapable of doing their jobs after a certain
point in their pregnancies. Because there was no opportunity given an
individual teacher to rebut the presumption as applied to her, the rule
was held to violate due process requirements. 276
It would seem that a scientist could raise a similar challenge to any
governmental decision interfering with research on the basis of a pre-
sumption. For example, a government funding agency might an-
nounce a cutoff of funds allocated to a certain area of research, be-
cause of a stated or unstated presumption that nothing productive or
useful could come of research in that area, or that research in that
273. Twining v. NewJersey, 211 U.S. 78, 110-11 (1908).
274. Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. Colorado, 239 U.S. 441, 445 (1915) (state property
tax increase sustained over procedural due process challenge by individual owners).
275. 414U.S. 632(1974).
276. This approach has its critics, who claim that it is really not a due process
analysis at all, but rather an equal protection analysis. For example, the dissenters
in LaFleur argued that the proper way to frame the issue would have been in terms
of sex discrimination under the equal protection clause. Id. at 657. For other recent
examples of irrebuttable presumption analyses, see Department of Agriculture v.
Murry, 413 U.S. 508 (1973) (limitations on federal food stamp eligibility); Vlan-
dis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973) (durational residency requirements for reduced
state university tuition); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (distribution of
contraceptives).
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area would be too dangerous or socially disruptive.277 If no opportu-
nity were afforded interested scientists to rebut the presumption, the
cutoff could be vulnerable to a procedural due process challenge.
This assumes, of course, that a scientist could be found who satisfied
the requirements of expectancy and claim of entitlement. 278
Apart from the first amendment, these due process arguments pro-
vide the best avenue of redress for individual researchers with whose
work the government has impermissibly interfered. Other theories are
also available when the government interferes with large numbers or
groups of researchers, or treats them less favorably than members of
other groups.
2. Equal protection
Equal protection challenges arise in connection with legislative
classifications alleged to be unconstitutional under the fourteenth
amendment.27 9 Broadly speaking, equal protection challenges trigger
one of two levels of judicial review: a more or less deferential "ration-
ality" standard applicable to classifications established by most eco-
nomic and social legislation,28 0 and a stiffer "strict scrutiny" stan-
277. The "too dangerous" presumption is a very real possibility in connection
with recombinant DNA research. Procedural due process would require that a scien-
tist be allowed the opportunity to rebut the presumption by showing that various
containment safeguards have eliminated the danger or reduced it to an acceptable
level.
278. The plaintiffs in Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 634-37
(1974), were pregnant women who had been terminated from their teaching positions
under a mandatory leave provision; in Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 443-44
(1973), they were college students required to pay nonresident tuition under a pro-
vision that presumed a continuing nonresident status. Similarly, it would seem that
scientists would need to show that they were in imminent danger of being deprived
of research opportunities in order to be able to assert an irrebuttable presumption
challenge.
279. "No State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal pro-
tection of the laws." U.S. CON T. amend. XIV, § 1.
280. Under the "mere rationality" standard, the classification must bear a ra-
tional relationship to the stated legislative purpose; it is a standard which deals al-
most totally with legislative means with little regard to the ends in view. Under the
Warren Court, according to Professor Gunther, this tended to be "minimal scrutiny
in theory and virtually none in fact." Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 8 (1972). The Burger Court has often abandoned the very deferential ra-
tionality standard of the Warren era to embrace instead what Gunther calls "mini-
mum scrutiny with bite," which demands that the classification rationally and sub-
stantially further some legitimate, articulated (rather than conceivable) state inter-
est. G. GUNTHER, supra note 240, at 661-63.
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dard 281 in the presence of either a "suspect" classification-race, 82
alienage,283 or one of certain sex-based classifications 2 4-- or a classi-
fication having an impact on "fundamental" rights or interests. 285
Conceptually, the major difference between these two broad levels
of review has to do with whether means or ends are being reviewed.2 86
The rationality standard examines legislative means, proceeding from
a notion that similarly situated persons must be similarly treated by
the government, 287 and requiring only that legislative means be ra-
tionally congruent with legitimate legislative ends. Any legislative
classification which is reasonably calculated to accomplish the stated
objective is deemed to be permissible.
Strict scrutiny, on the other hand, is not concerned so much with
legislative means as with legislative ends: it proceeds from a notion
that the consequences stemming from certain classifications render
those classifications impermissible. The fundamental interest strand
of strict scrutiny analysis presumes that legislative classifications
which have the effect of burdening enjoyment of a fundamental lib-
erty violate equal protection regardless of whether they bear a
rational relation to the stated legislative purpose. Such classifications
will be struck down unless the state can show a compelling interest in
their continued application.
To illustrate, suppose the government were to impose an outright
281. Strict scrutiny deals with legislative ends as well as means: the classification
must further a compelling state interest, and must be closely congruent with the
stated purpose of the statute. Gunther writes that during the Warren era this level of
scrutiny generally was " 'strict' in theory and fatal in fact." Gunther, supra note 280,
at 8. The Burger Court has shown gathering disenchantment with the Warren Court's
rigid two-tier system, but has declined to abandon it. See G. GUNTHER, supra note 240,
at 660-61.
282. E.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
283. E.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
284. E.g., Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975); Frontiero v. Richard-
son, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
285. "The list of interests identified as fundamental by the Warren Court was in
fact quite modest: voting [e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663
(1966)], criminal appeals [e.g., Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956)], and the
right of interstate travel [e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969)] were
the prime examples." G. GUNTHER, supra note 240, at 659. The Burger Court has
declined to expand this list of fundamental interests, refusing to extend strict scru-
tiny to equal protection challenges involving welfare, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams,
397 U.S. 471 (1970); housing, e.g., Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972); and
education, e.g., San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1
(1973).
286. See generally G. GUNTHER, supra note 240, at 657-65.




ban on recombinant DNA research. On its face, such a prohibition
might appear to be immune to an equal protection challenge, because
it would apply equally to all scientists. In practical application, how-
ever, it arguably would create a class of scientists-those who wished
to engage in recombinant DNA research-which would be treated
dissimilarly from other scientists. Framing the challenge in this man-
ner, recombinant DNA researchers could allege a governmental clas-
sification which impinges on their fundamental first amendment liber-
ties, thereby invoking strict judicial scrutiny under the fundamental
rights strand of equal protection analysis.
As was observed earlier, government ought not be allowed to do in-
directly what it cannot do directly.288 Consequently, grounds for a
similar equal protection challenge would arise in connection with a
governmental decision to deny funding to scientists working in certain
areas.289 The argument would revolve around the proposition that, al-
though a scientist may not assert an unqualified right to be granted
government funds, 290 he may assert a right not to be denied otherwise
available funds because of objections to the content (rather than the
merit)291 of his proposed research.
Imagine, for example, a statute appropriating funds to be allocated
among researchers on the basis of the merits of their proposed proj-
ects, but with a proviso forbidding allocation of any funds for investi-
gations into the genetic components of intelligence.2 92 With respect to
scientists generally, such a statute arguably would create a classifica-
tion which discriminates against certain geneticists as potential
recipients of government funds. It seems likely that geneticists chal-
lenging such a classification could persuade the courts to invoke strict
judicial scrutiny, because they would be impeded in their attempt to
288. See Part IV-A-4 supra.
289. See note 235 and accompanying text supra.
290. The Court has made it clear that citizens have no fundamental right to
demand public funds, even if sought to finance the exercise of an acknowledged
fundamental right. In the area of welfare spending, for example, the Court ruled
_that although women have a fundamental right to procure abortions, Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973), the government is under no obligation to subsidize abortions
for women who cannot afford them. The Abortion Funding Cases: Beal v. Doe, 432
U.S. 438 (1977); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S.
519 (1977). Similarly, even though scientists may assert a fundamental right to pursue
scientific research, it seems clear they cannot assert an unqualified fundamental right
to government funding.
291. See note 237 supra.
292. See note 20 supra.
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exercise fundamental first amendment liberties while scientists pursu-
ing research in other areas would not be so impeded.
Certainly they could persuade the courts to invoke at least the ra-
tionality standard applicable to all legislative classifications. 293 In
Department of Agriculture v. Moreno,294 the Court held that a "bare
congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot
constitute a legitimate governmental interest."2 95 In Moreno, the
Court held unconstitutional a provision in the federal food stamp pro-
gram of assistance to "households." The provision defined "house-
holds" as limited to related persons; any household with an unrelated
person was ineligible for food stamps. The Court found that this defi-
nition created an irrational classification aimed at excluding "hippie
communes" from the food stamp program. 296 The Court's reasoning
in Moreno297 appears to open the door for rationality-standard equal
protection challenges to governmental funding decisions that can be
shown to be based on a legislative desire to stifle unpopular or poten-
tially sensitive research. Because of the heavier burden of proof
placed on challengers who assert simply that legislative action fails for
lack of rationality,298 scientists who wish to challenge such action
should, whenever possible, couch their attack in fundamental-interest
terms.
V. CONCLUSION
The foregoing review of constitutional history, first amendment
theoretical rationales, and first amendment case law suggests that a
293. See note 280 and accompanying text supra.
294. 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
295. Id. at 534 (emphasis in original).
296. Id. According to Professor Gunther, Moreno is an example of the interme-
diate "minimal scrutiny with bite," see note 280 supra, a stiffer test than "mere ra-
tionality" but not as stiff as "strict scrutiny." G. GUNTHER, supra note 240, at 871.
See also Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974) (arguably applying interme-
diate scrutiny), discussed in G. GUNTHER, supra at 872-74.
297. The reasoning in Moreno has been cited with approval in at least two cases,
Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976), and Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749
(1975). In neither case, however, was Moreno's rationale applied to invalidate the
challenged statutory classifications.
298. See note 238 supra for a discussion of the different burdens of proof re-
quired to sustain a constitutional challenge. A rationality-standard challenge would
have a better chance of succeeding if the Court applied the "minimal scrutiny with
bite" analysis of Moreno, see notes 280 & 296 supra, than if it applied the tradi-
tionally deferential "mere rationality" analysis of the Warren era. Certainly any
scientist mounting an equal protection challenge ought to argue for the stiffer
standard.
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persuasive case can be made for including scientific inquiry within the
field of protected expression. The additional due process and equal
protection arguments merely serve to buttress the central first amend-
ment structure for a constitutional challenge to governmental interfer-
ence in the conduct of basic research. To the extent that governmental
action trenches on an individual scientist's right to carry out basic re-
search and does so on grounds of content rather than concerns
legitimately falling within the state's funding or police power, such ac-
tion should be examined under the more stringent model of judicial
review courts have developed in cases involving infringement of fun-
damental interests.
In any such review, elements which should militate in favor of pro-
tection of basic research include (i) the extent to which the research at
issue is essential to the generation of new ideas or theories; (ii) the ex-
tent to which the inquiry contains as an essential component teaching,
learning, writing, or other protected activity; (iii) the extent to which
the research contributes to social or political discourse essential to
self-government; (iv) the extent to which the research is fundamental,
or basic, thus affording the state an opportunity to intervene at a later
point should harmful effects appear. From the point of view of the
government, action will be least likely to raise constitutional problems
if it (v) is demonstrably predicated on the police power or power of
the purse, rather than on an intent to quell legitimate inquiry; (vi) as a
corollary, is aimed at negative externalities or consequences of the re-
search rather than its content.
When the individual researcher's interest is high in the elements
which argue for protection and the state's interest in intervening is low
in those that confer legitimacy, courts should not hesitate to exercise
their historic function of interceding on behalf of critical liberty inter-
ests. This would seem particularly true when the inquiry touches on
social or political decisionmaking; these, after all, are the essential
mechanisms of democratic functioning, which courts have never hesi-
tated to protect.
Surely there will be difficult cases; the contours of the decisional
law relating to speech and expression have been to a large extent
drawn by such difficult or borderline cases and there is no reason to
hope that regulation of scientific inquiry will prove any less difficult.
Nevertheless, polar issues will arise and, if Emerson's prediction is
correct, this may well happen soon. If so, the conceptual approach
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suggested herein may prove helpful to courts faced with the difficult
task of assessing the degree of protection appropriate to an old inter-
est in modern dress.
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